139 N.E.3d 712
Ind.2020Background
- Alialy executed a 25-year promissory note secured by a mortgage with an optional acceleration clause; payments began in Sept. 2007.
- Alialy defaulted and stopped payments in July 2008; the note later transferred to Collins Asset Group (CAG).
- CAG exercised the optional acceleration clause in October 2016 and demanded payment in full.
- CAG sued to recover on the accelerated note in April 2017; Alialy moved to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) as time-barred under the six-year statute for promissory notes.
- The trial court granted dismissal; the Court of Appeals affirmed, but this Court granted transfer and vacated the lower opinions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (CAG) | Defendant's Argument (Alialy) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of UCC statute (Ind. Code §26-1-3.1-118(a)) | CAG preserved the timeliness issue; whether under the general statute or the UCC, the six-year period applies | CAG failed to cite the UCC below and therefore waived the UCC argument on appeal | No waiver: trial court and Alialy had notice of the timeliness issue; raising the UCC on appeal was proper, but the point is ultimately immaterial |
| Whether claim is time‑barred | Suit filed within six years of CAG’s 2016 acceleration; accrual can occur at acceleration, so claim is timely | Accrual should be measured from the initial default (2008); waiting years to accelerate is unreasonable and renders claim untimely | Under either applicable statute, accrual can occur at acceleration; CAG sued within six years of acceleration, so the claim is not time‑barred |
| Whether courts should impose a judicial “reasonableness” limit on delayed acceleration | No additional judicial rule is needed; existing statutes of limitations govern and suffice | Court should restrict the lender’s ability to accelerate after an extended delay as plainly unreasonable | Court declines to add a judicial reasonableness constraint for enforcement of closed installment contracts; statutes control |
| Applicability of two statutes of limitations (general note statute vs. UCC) | Both statutes apply equally and provide identical timing paths when enforcing a promissory note after acceleration | Relied on general statute below and argued accrual earlier | Both the general promissory-note statute and the UCC statute apply; they allow multiple accrual dates including acceleration |
Key Cases Cited
- Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 87 N.E.3d 462 (Ind. 2017) (standard of review for Trial Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal)
- Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133 (Ind. 2014) (appellate rule allowing new arguments when issue was presented below and opposing party had notice)
- Bielat v. Folta, 229 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 1967) (principle that appellate courts may consider new arguments within issues presented below)
- Hochstedler v. St. Joseph Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 770 N.E.2d 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (notice is crucial to permit new issues on appeal)
- Collins Asset Grp., LLC v. Alialy, 115 N.E.3d 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (Court of Appeals’ earlier opinion affirming dismissal before transfer)