Collier v. State
307 Ga. 363
Ga.2019Background
- Collier was indicted in 2008 and on September 9, 2009 pleaded guilty to felony murder and was sentenced to life; remaining counts were nolle prossed.
- On October 1, 2018 Collier filed a pro se motion in the trial court for an out‑of‑time appeal, alleging plea counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of his right to appeal and that he asked counsel immediately after sentencing to withdraw the plea and appeal.
- The Macon County Superior Court denied Collier’s motion without an evidentiary hearing on December 20, 2018 after “reviewing the record and applicable law.”
- This Court appointed appellate counsel, solicited supplemental briefing on Garza, Flores‑Ortega, and Ringold, heard argument, and concluded Georgia precedent required reexamination.
- The Supreme Court vacated the trial‑court order and remanded for proceedings consistent with the clarified standards; it overruled Morrow and a line of Georgia cases that limited appeals from guilty pleas to issues resolvable on the record.
- The Court also held that the State may assert a prejudicial‑delay defense to motions for out‑of‑time appeal filed in the trial court, but did not abolish the trial‑court procedural vehicle.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court denied out‑of‑time appeal without a hearing based on plea‑counsel ineffectiveness | Collier: counsel failed to inform him of appeal right; court should have held an evidentiary hearing | State: trial court reviewed record and applicable law and denied motion | Vacated and remanded; trial court must make factual inquiry and may need to hold a hearing under clarified standards |
| Whether a movant who seeks an out‑of‑time appeal after a guilty plea must show the hypothetical appeal would have had merit | Collier: not required; Flores‑Ortega/Garza prescribe presumption of prejudice | Georgia precedent (Morrow line): required showing appealable issues resolvable on the record | Overruled Morrow and related authority; no requirement to show appeal would have had merit |
| Proper procedural vehicle and defenses: May out‑of‑time appeals be sought in trial court and may State raise prejudicial delay? | Collier: sought relief in trial court | District Attorney: urged abolishing trial‑court motions and confining remedy to habeas to invoke statutory limitations and prejudicial‑delay defenses | Court left trial‑court vehicle intact for now but held State may assert prejudicial‑delay (laches) defense; parameters of that defense to be developed later |
| Standard to prove counsel’s ineffectiveness that deprived defendant of appeal | Collier: alleges he told counsel he wanted to withdraw plea and appeal | State: denial appropriate based on record/legal standards | Confirmed Strickland governs; court must determine whether counsel caused the failure to pursue appeal and whether there is a reasonable probability the defendant would have timely appealed (prejudice presumed when appeal was lost due to deficient performance) |
Key Cases Cited
- Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019) (prejudice is presumed when counsel’s deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal he otherwise would have taken)
- Roe v. Flores‑Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (Strickland framework applies to counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal; courts must inquire whether counsel consulted and whether defendant would have appealed)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Ringold v. State, 304 Ga. 875 (2019) (Georgia discussion of out‑of‑time appeals and application of Strickland principles)
- Morrow v. State, 266 Ga. 3 (1995) (overruled) (previously held appeals from guilty pleas lie only for issues resolvable on the record)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969) (remedy of resentencing to permit perfection of an appeal when counsel’s deficiency deprived defendant of appeal)
- Bailey v. State, 306 Ga. 364 (2019) (explains necessity to allege and prove a constitutional excuse for failing to file a timely direct appeal; ineffective‑assistance-of‑appeal claims reviewed under Strickland)