Colin Dickey v. Ron Davis, 69 F.4th 624

Background

In 1988 two people (Caton and Freiri) were murdered; no physical evidence linked Colin Dickey directly to the killings and the State prosecuted him as an aider-and-abettor seeking the death penalty under California special‑circumstances rules.
The prosecution’s principal live witness was roommate Gene Buchanan, whose trial testimony attributed to Dickey an expressed thought evidencing intent to kill and supplied key inculpatory details not otherwise strongly supported.
On redirect the prosecutor elicited (and had the court read aloud) Cal. Penal Code §128, then elicited affirmative answers from Buchanan that falsely claimed the DA’s office had given him nothing and that he had met with prosecutor Ken Hahus only “a couple of times.” The prosecutor never corrected those statements and relied on them in closing.
After trial new evidence showed the DA’s office had arranged credit housing for Buchanan at a boarding house and that Hahus had met Buchanan many more times ("probably a dozen"); the prosecutor also had notes and knowledge contradicting Buchanan’s testimony that were not disclosed to defense counsel.
State courts denied Napue/Brady relief; on federal habeas the Ninth Circuit held the state court’s determination—under AEDPA—that the Napue error was immaterial was objectively unreasonable, reversed as to the special‑circumstances findings and death sentence, and affirmed denial of guilt‑phase claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Napue: Did prosecutor knowingly present/ fail to correct false testimony (false denials of prosecution favors and limited meetings) and was it material to penalty‑phase special‑circumstances?	Dickey: Prosecutor knowingly elicited and exploited Buchanan’s false answers; correction would have materially undermined Buchanan’s credibility and the special‑circumstances verdict.	State: Jury already had reasons to distrust Buchanan (drugs, reward motive, antipathy to Dickey, evidence of housing arrangement in record), so the false testimony was harmless.	Ninth Circuit: Prosecutor violated Napue; under AEDPA the state court’s harmlessness ruling was objectively unreasonable. On de novo review, the false testimony was material to penalty‑phase findings; grant conditional relief on special‑circumstances and death sentence.
Brady: Did the State withhold favorable impeachment evidence (DA notes, details of housing arrangement)?	Dickey: DA withheld impeachment evidence (notes, role in arranging boarding house) that would have impeached Buchanan.	State: Some housing documents existed in the record; any withheld evidence was not material to guilt or sentencing.	Ninth Circuit resolved Napue defect dispositively and did not reach all Brady claims on the merits; Brady failures formed critical factual backdrop supporting Napue materiality.
AEDPA deference / Materiality standard: Was the California Supreme Court’s ruling an unreasonable application of Napue under §2254(d)?	Dickey: State court applied Napue materiality unreasonably given Buchanan’s central role and the specific impeachment that showing he lied under oath would have produced.	State: The state court reasonably concluded no reasonable likelihood the correction would have changed the verdict.	Ninth Circuit: AEDPA bar overcome—the state decision was objectively unreasonable; Napue materiality satisfied.
Guilt‑phase ineffective assistance / jury selection and investigation claims	Dickey: Trial counsel’s jury‑selection strategy (seeking pro‑death jurors) and failure to investigate/produce impeachment (e.g., call boarding‑house owner) prejudiced guilt verdict.	State: Other corroborating evidence (Goldman, Stokes) and juror assurances mitigated prejudice; no biased juror was seated.	Ninth Circuit: Affirmed denial of guilt‑phase claims; court found state court could reasonably have concluded no prejudice and counsel’s choices reasonable or not shown to be outcome‑determinative.

Key Cases Cited

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (conviction invalid where prosecution knowingly uses false testimony or fails to correct it; materiality standard protects truth‑seeking function)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence to the defense)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Napue applied where witness promises or benefits affect credibility; impeachment by evidence of inducement is material)
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (discusses materiality standards for impeachment and relationship between Brady and Napue principles)
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (due process violated by deliberate use of perjured testimony)
Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (failure to correct material false impression violates due process)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (discusses when AEDPA deference may be set aside and de novo review applied)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady materiality requires reasonable probability of different result)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality and cumulative effect of withheld impeachment evidence)