2020 IL App (2d) 190627
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Decedent Raashanai J. Coley died on September 5, 2014; her mother, Nicholette Lawrence, was later charged in connection with the death.
- The maternal grandfather, Carlton North, provided Bradshaw & Range Funeral Home with a written release and two authorization forms and arranged for cremation on September 26, 2014; plaintiff Raashan Coley (father/next of kin) did not learn of the death until October 9 and was absent at the time.
- Coley sued Bradshaw alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, willful/wanton interference, and negligent interference with his right to possess the remains (count III).
- Bradshaw moved to dismiss count III under section 2-619(a)(9), invoking section 45 of the Disposition of Remains Act (which immunizes funeral establishments that carry out directions of a person representing entitlement to control disposition, except for gross negligence or willful acts).
- The trial court granted dismissal of the negligence count; the jury later returned verdicts for Bradshaw on the remaining counts. Coley appealed the dismissal of count III.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §45 of the Remains Act shields a funeral establishment from ordinary negligence liability absent proof of reasonable reliance on the authorizing person | Coley: §45 must be read to require reasonable reliance; otherwise a funeral home could knowingly carry out a killer’s directions | Bradshaw: §45’s plain text requires no reliance element; carrying out the directions of a person who represents entitlement is enough | Held: §45 does not require a reasonable-reliance element; plain language controls and shields Bradshaw for ordinary negligence |
| Whether §20(b) (relinquishing control when a person is charged with murder) imposes an independent duty on funeral directors not to rely on such persons | Coley: §20(b) creates a duty for funeral directors to not rely on instructions from a charged killer | Bradshaw: §20(b) only states a condition for relinquishment of rights and does not create a separate duty on funeral directors | Held: §20(b) does not impose an independent duty on funeral directors; it revokes a person’s right when the funeral director knows of the charge |
| Whether other statutes (Crematory Regulation Act; Slayer Statute) or in pari materia principles require a reliance element or otherwise limit §45 immunity | Coley: Crematory Regulation Act and Slayer Statute support imposing a reliance/knowledge limitation on §45 | Bradshaw: Those statutes do not nullify §45; any knowing misconduct is covered by the willful/gross-negligence exception | Held: No need to read reliance into §45 to harmonize statutes; knowing misconduct falls outside §45 as willful or gross negligence |
| Whether Bradshaw was required to make reasonable efforts to locate an absent next-of-kin (Coley) before relying on North’s authorization | Coley: §5(5) and analogous provisions impose an obligation to use reasonable efforts to locate absent parents; Bradshaw failed to do so | Bradshaw: The statutes place notice/effort obligations on family/authorizing agents and the authorizing agent’s forms represent such efforts; Bradshaw relied on North’s representations | Held: Under the circumstances, Coley failed to show Bradshaw was obligated to locate him; Bradshaw’s uncontradicted affidavit established it carried out North’s instructions |
Key Cases Cited
- Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill. 2d 181 (1995) (unchallenged supporting affidavits are deemed admitted)
- Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267 (1994) (definition and scope of willful conduct)
- Rekosh v. Parks, 316 Ill. App. 3d 58 (2000) (funeral home facilitation of unauthorized cremation can be extreme/outrageous; knowing conduct may be willful)
- People ex rel. Birkett v. Dockery, 235 Ill. 2d 73 (2009) (court will not read exceptions into a statute beyond its plain language)
- Cochran v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 2017 IL 121200 (2017) (recognition of negligent interference with right to possess corpse as tort)