Coleman v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10721

Tracey Coleman, proceeding pro se, sought to proceed without prepayment of fees and consented to a magistrate judge deciding the case.
The magistrate judge dismissed Coleman’s IFP case for failure to state a claim before the Commission had been served.
The Commission had not yet been served, raising questions about whether its consent (as a party) was obtained for a dispositive ruling.
The district court’s dismissal and final judgment occurred at screening, with Coleman appealing the district court’s jurisdiction and the magistrate judge’s authority.
The Seventh Circuit considered whether consent by all parties is required for a magistrate judge to enter a final dispositive judgment under § 636(c)(1).
The court ultimately held that final judgments may not be entered by a magistrate judge absent consent by all parties affected by the ruling.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 636(c)(1) requires consent by all parties for a magistrate judge to enter a final judgment	Coleman argued only the plaintiff needed to consent.	Commission argued consent from the plaintiff was sufficient or any party’s consent could be inferred.	No; all affected parties must consent.
Whether a dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is a merits dismissal requiring all parties’ consent	Dismissal at IFP screening is a non-merits action that magistrate judges can finalize with plaintiff consent alone.	Such a dismissal is an adjudication on the merits and requires full party consent.	It is a merits-like dismissal; full consent required.
Whether an unserved defendant can be considered a ‘party’ for purposes of § 636(c)(1) consent	Unserved defendants should count as parties for consent purposes at screening.	Unserved defendants should not be treated as parties for consent purposes.	Unserved defendants are not required to consent; all named parties bound by the judgment must consent.

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (U.S. 1999) (service-based party status; relevance to when a party becomes bound)
Geaney v. Carlson, 776 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1985) (consent to magistrate final judgment; Geaney favored consent by both parties)
Hains v. Washington, 131 F.3d 1248 (7th Cir. 1997) (magistrate consent at screening; dispute over party scope)
Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2011) (consent by all parties required for magistrate to render final judgment)
Cambridge Holdings Group, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 489 F.3d 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finality rules; application to Rule 54(b) and related considerations)
Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530 (5th Cir. 1995) (unserved defendant not a party for § 636(c) consent purposes)