Coleman v. East Joliet Fire Protection District
2016 IL 117952
| Ill. | 2016Background
- Coretta Coleman called 911 reporting she could not breathe; the call was transferred between Will County 911 and Orland Central Dispatch, and dispatchers and ambulance crews failed to secure timely access to her residence. She died of cardiac arrest ~41 minutes after the initial call.
- Plaintiff (administrator of Coleman’s estate) sued East Joliet Fire Protection District and its EMTs, Will County and its 911 operator, and Orland Fire Protection District and its dispatcher for wrongful death and survival, alleging negligent and willful & wanton conduct depriving Coretta of a chance to survive.
- Trial court dismissed negligence counts based on statutory immunities but denied dismissal of willful-and-wanton counts; on summary judgment the court granted defendants judgment under the common-law public duty rule (no special duty), and did not reach statutory-immunity defenses.
- The appellate court affirmed; the Illinois Supreme Court granted review to address the continued viability of the public duty rule.
- The Supreme Court considered (1) the history of sovereign and local governmental immunity, (2) the origin and application of the public duty rule and its special-duty exception, and (3) whether the rule conflicts with statutory limited immunities (e.g., willful-and-wanton exceptions).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the public duty rule remains viable in Illinois | Coleman: public duty rule is obsolete and equivalent to sovereign immunity; court should abolish it | Defendants: public duty rule remains binding precedent and bars individual duty here | Court: abolished the public duty rule and its special-duty exception; apply ordinary tort principles unless legislature provides immunity |
| Whether a special duty existed to Coretta (fact application) | Coleman: alleged facts (calls, dispatcher/EMT conduct) give rise to a duty/special duty and support willful-and-wanton claim | Defendants: no special duty; plaintiff initiated contact and was not under defendant’s control; public duty rule barred recovery | Court: remanded to determine liability under ordinary tort standards (did not decide duty on the facts) |
| Whether summary judgment was properly granted based on public duty rule | Coleman: summary judgment improper because rule abolished | Defendants: summary judgment proper under existing public duty precedent | Court: reversed summary judgment and remanded for proceedings under conventional tort analysis |
| Interaction of public duty rule with statutory immunities (willful & wanton exceptions) | Coleman: public duty rule conflicts with legislative intent to permit recovery for willful & wanton conduct; statutory scheme renders the rule obsolete | Defendants: statutory immunities coexist with public duty rule; immunity issues resolve claims | Court: found incompatibility and determined statutory immunities and legislative policy make judicial public-duty rule obsolete; left statutory immunity defenses (e.g., whether conduct was willful & wanton) for lower court to resolve |
Key Cases Cited
- Huey v. Town of Cicero, 41 Ill.2d 361 (Ill. 1968) (early Illinois statement of the public duty rule)
- Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill.2d 11 (Ill. 1959) (abolition of common-law local governmental immunity)
- Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill.2d 30 (Ill. 1998) (distinguishing duty questions from statutory immunities; earlier recognition that public duty rule survived sovereign-immunity abrogation)
- Leone v. City of Chicago, 156 Ill.2d 33 (Ill. 1993) (discussion of municipality liability and special-duty exception)
- Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill.2d 335 (Ill. 1998) (affirming retention of the public duty rule prior to this decision)
- South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 396 (U.S. 1855) (U.S. Supreme Court origin of the public-duty concept)