Cole v. Boehnlein, 2:22-cv-01408

Plaintiff Tequila L. Cole, a TCI inmate, alleges that on Sept. 7, 2022 C/O Carol Boehnlein performed a PAT (personal) search that went beyond a routine pat-down, including forceful chops to the groin and repeated fondling/caressing of Cole’s genital area.
The search occurred in a hallway; Cole says she did not consent to vaginal touching, felt humiliated, and reported the incident to mental-health staff; a PREA incident report was filed.
Cole acknowledges Boehnlein was permitted to conduct a PAT search but contends the manner, scope, and location rendered it unreasonable and constituted sexual/physical abuse.
Cole filed a pro se § 1983 amended complaint alleging constitutional violations; the Court screened the amended complaint under the PLRA and Rule 12(b)(6)/Iqbal–Twombly standards.
The Court found Cole’s allegations sufficient at the pleading stage to proceed on a Fourth Amendment claim for an unconstitutional strip/search based on the manner and location of the search, but did not adopt a separate Eighth Amendment punitive-punishment claim.
The Court ordered service, directed Defendant to file a responsive pleading within 60 days, and required any exhaustion-related challenges to be raised by summary-judgment motion within 45 days of service.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment	Cole: PAT became an unreasonable strip/search due to invasive touching, fondling, and conduct in a public hallway	Boehnlein: PAT search justified to locate contraband; search served penological objectives	Court: Allowed claim to proceed — pleadings plausibly allege an unreasonable manner/location of search under the Fourth Amendment
Whether conduct states an Eighth Amendment claim for malicious punishment	Cole: Conduct was sexualized and punitive, causing humiliation and pain	Boehnlein: PAT was for security, not punishment	Court: Focused on Fourth Amendment reasonableness; Eighth Amendment requires subjective malicious intent and was not the basis for allowing the claim to proceed at screening
Pleading sufficiency under the PLRA/Rule 12(b)(6)	Cole: Factual allegations are specific enough to show unreasonable intrusion	Defendant: (Anticipated) challenge that allegations fail to state a claim or are subject to dismissal	Court: Under Iqbal/Twombly and pro se lenity, allegations are sufficient to survive screening and proceed to case-stage fact development
Exhaustion of administrative remedies	Cole: alleges incident was reported and PREA report filed	Defendant: (Anticipated) may argue failure to exhaust remedies	Court: Ordered defendant to raise exhaustion defenses by summary-judgment within 45 days of service

Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2017) (prisoner-complaint screening standard under PLRA)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2012) (screening standard guidance)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2020) (distinguishing Eighth and Fourth Amendment frameworks for prisoner searches)
Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2004) (strip-search justification and limits)
Peckham v. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998) (penological justification for searches)
Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1994) (standards for prison searches)