Colbert v. City of Chicago
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4486
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- In March 2011 police officers and IDOC parole agents conducted a parole compliance check at a residence shared by Jai Crutcher (on mandatory supervised release) and Christopher Colbert; both were handcuffed and prevented from observing the search.
- Officers recovered a loaded, unregistered 12‑gauge shotgun and ammunition from a locked bedroom; a .40 cal case (but not the handgun) was also found; both men admitted ownership of firearms; both were arrested; charges were later dismissed or resulted in acquittal.
- Crutcher was indicted by a grand jury and later acquitted; he sued for malicious prosecution under Illinois law. Colbert sued under § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations (unreasonable search and property damage) and the City for false arrest based on an allegedly unconstitutional municipal firearm ordinance.
- Officer Willingham’s criminal complaint mistakenly cited Chicago Mun. Code § 8‑20‑040 but later stated the correct ordinance was § 8‑20‑140 (a scrivener’s error); plaintiffs attempted to challenge ordinance(s) during summary-judgment briefing.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiffs’ malicious-prosecution, Fourth Amendment (search/person/bedroom and property damage), and municipal false-arrest claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious prosecution (Crutcher) | Willingham lied in arrest report and that lie led to prosecution; police conduct caused continuation of prosecution | Grand-jury indictment broke the chain of causation absent evidence police pressured prosecutor or that prosecutor relied on Willingham’s alleged false statements | Affirmed dismissal: indictment defeats malicious-prosecution claim absent evidence police influenced prosecutor or prosecutor relied on known falsehoods |
| Fourth Amendment — search of person/bedroom (Colbert) | Officers used unreasonable force to take keys and enter locked bedroom; claim arises from pleadings and depositions | Claims about person/bedroom were not pleaded; plaintiffs cannot amend the complaint via summary-judgment response | Affirmed: those theories were unpleaded and cannot be introduced at summary judgment |
| Fourth Amendment — property damage (Colbert) | Officers destroyed property during the search; plaintiffs could not observe which officers caused damage because they were removed during search | §1983 requires individual liability; Colbert cannot identify which named officers caused damage and did not plead conspiracy of silence or join all officers | Affirmed summary judgment: no evidence linking the named defendants personally to the alleged property damage |
| Municipal liability / false arrest (Colbert v. City) | City enforced an unconstitutional firearm ordinance (initially cited §8‑20‑040) that caused Colbert’s arrest | Willingham’s citation to §8‑20‑040 was a scrivener’s error; actual charge arose under §8‑20‑140 and plaintiffs waived any challenge to §8‑20‑140 by raising it only in opposition to summary judgment | Affirmed: plaintiffs waived challenge to §8‑20‑140; no municipal policy/unconstitutional ordinance shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 647 F.3d 723 (7th Cir.) (standard for reviewing summary judgment)
- Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823 (7th Cir.) (elements of malicious prosecution under Illinois law)
- Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir.) (indictment breaks chain of causation absent police pressure or knowing misstatements to prosecutor)
- Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892 (7th Cir.) (need to show postarrest actions that influenced prosecutor to maintain malicious-prosecution claim against officers)
- Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff may not amend pleadings by opposing summary judgment or introduce new factual bases)
- Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278 (7th Cir.) (Fourth Amendment remedy for unreasonable property destruction during a search)
- Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F.3d 963 (7th Cir.) (need for allegations linking particular officers or a conspiracy of silence to satisfy §1983 personal‑responsibility requirement)
- Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491 (7th Cir.) (failure-to-intervene theory: officers nearby who had opportunity to intervene may be liable)