Coinmach Corp. F/K/A Solon Automated Services, Inc. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp.
417 S.W.3d 909
| Tex. | 2013Background
- Foreclosure terminated Coinmach’s lease; Coinmach remained in the laundry rooms as a tenant at sufferance after foreclosure; Aspenwood promptly sought possession via FED actions and later sued for trespass, trespass to title, DTPA, and declaratory relief; Coinmach asserted it held a possessory interest and disputed termination; lower courts split on whether a tenant at sufferance could breach the lease, be liable in tort, or recover under UDJA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a tenant at sufferance can be liable for breach of a terminated lease. | Aspenwood argues continued liability under the original lease. | Coinmach contends no lease exists post-foreclosure, no breach occurs. | No; no contract to breach exists. |
| Whether a tenant at sufferance is a trespasser and liable for torts. | Tenant’s possession harms landlord’s rights; trespass and damages should apply. | FED and grace-period procedures limit liability. | Tenant at sufferance is a trespasser; may be liable for torts including trespass and interference depending on damages. |
| Whether Aspenwood is a consumer under the DTPA. | Coinmach’s services to landlords indirectly benefited Aspenwood; consumer status plausible. | Aspenwood did not seek goods/services from Coinmach; benefits were indirect. | Aspenwood not a consumer under the DTPA. |
| Whether Aspenwood’s declaratory judgment claim is duplicative of trespass to title and barred by UDJA. | UDJA available to determine rights under contracts/agreements. | Trespass to title governs possessory/ownership rights; UDJA not appropriate. | UDJA claim barred; render judgment against Aspenwood on declaratory relief. |
| Whether Aspenwood can sustain tortious interference with prospective business relations against Coinmach. | Coinmach’s continued possession impeded Aspenwood’s ability to lease to others. | Trespass and possession under court orders may negate intent to interfere; limitations/intent issues apply. | Remand warranted; tribunal must evaluate whether heightened intent to interfere exists, given possible fraud in obtaining orders. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bockelmann v. Marynick, 788 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1990) (termination terminates lease; holdover can be treated as trespasser or tenant at will depending on conduct)
- ICM Mortg. Corp. v. Jacob, 902 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994) (holdover rights depend on conduct; consent creates holdover at will; otherwise sufferance)
- Lighthouse Church of Cloverleaf v. Texas Bank, 889 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994) (foreclosure creates right to possession; FED not sole remedy; eviction requires statutory process)
- Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262 (Tex. 2004) (trespass-to-title context; UDJA not a path for attorney’s fees when title determined by trespass statute)
- Barragan v. Munoz, 525 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1975) (holdover tenancy and application of lease terms depend on conduct; implied terms may apply)