Cohen v. Islamic Republic of Iran
238 F. Supp. 3d 71
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- On Aug. 19, 2003 a Hamas suicide bomber detonated an explosive on Egged Bus No. 2 in Jerusalem, killing 23 and injuring many, including Ora Cohen, her then-husband Shalom, and their five children.
- Plaintiffs are U.S. nationals (Ora and five children) and family members (some U.S. residents) who sued the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IRGC, and MOIS under the FSIA state-sponsor-of-terrorism exception, alleging Iran provided material support to Hamas that enabled the attack.
- Plaintiffs served Iran via diplomatic channels under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4); Iran did not appear and the Clerk entered default as to Iran, IRGC, and MOIS.
- Plaintiffs submitted expert declarations, Hamas-origin publications claiming responsibility, conviction records for co-conspirators, and witness testimony documenting physical and emotional injuries to prove material support, causation, and damages-related facts.
- The Court found subject‑matter and personal jurisdiction satisfied under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and § 1608, held defendants liable for battery, IIED, and solatium under the FSIA-linked causes of action and applicable tort law, and reserved damages for a special master to assess.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject‑matter jurisdiction under FSIA §1605A (state‑sponsor exception) | Iran was a designated state sponsor in 2003; victims or claimants were U.S. nationals; attack was an extrajudicial killing supported by Iran | (No appearance) Iran offered no contesting argument | Court: jurisdiction satisfied — Iran designated; Ora and children were U.S. nationals; Hamas bombing was an extrajudicial killing; Iran/IRGC/MOIS provided material support. |
| Personal jurisdiction / service of process under §1608 | Service by diplomatic channels (clerk → Sec. of State → Iran) complied with §1608(a)(4) and establishes personal jurisdiction | (No appearance) | Court: service was proper and personal jurisdiction exists. |
| Liability under FSIA / tort claims (battery, IIED, solatium) — causation and intent via material support | Iran’s routine funding, training, weapons transfers and other support to Hamas renders it liable for foreseeable terrorist acts; plaintiffs suffered physical and severe emotional harm | (No appearance) | Court: Defendants liable. Material support doctrine does not require showing support specifically caused this particular attack where state routinely funded the group. Plaintiffs proved harmful contact, extreme/outrageous conduct, and severe emotional distress for claimants. |
| Damages procedure / quantum | Plaintiffs seek monetary and punitive damages | (No appearance) | Court: Liability established but damages deferred; Court will appoint a special master per 28 U.S.C. §1605A(e)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 to evaluate and recommend awards. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (default judgments disfavored; adversary process should decide cases)
- James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (court must assess subject‑matter jurisdiction despite default)
- Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (prima facie personal jurisdiction standard in absence of evidentiary hearing)
- Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (elements for FSIA §1605A jurisdiction)
- Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008) (recognition of Iran as state sponsor and FSIA application for Hamas attacks)
- Valore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 700 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2010) (use of Restatement tort principles to define FSIA liability and solatium/IIED overlap)
- Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 774 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (routine funneling of funds to terrorist groups satisfies material support requirement)
- Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011) (appointment of special master appropriate for assessing damages under §1605A)
- Ben‑Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2008) (terrorist acts are extreme and outrageous conduct for IIED/solatium claims)
- Wamai v. Republic of Sudan, 60 F. Supp. 3d 84 (D.D.C. 2014) (solatium recovery limited to immediate family and application of local law for non‑federal claimants)