1:09-cv-10230
S.D.N.Y.May 19, 2016Background
- Patricia and Steven Cohen divorced in 1990 after a negotiated separation agreement (1989 Separation Agreement) and later amended that agreement in 1992; Patricia claims Steven hid assets during the divorce by concealing repayments from the couple's investment with Brett Lurie (the "Lurie Investment").
- The Lurie Investment involved millions invested by Steven/SAC in a Queens co-op project conceived by Lurie; litigation (Cohen v. Lurie) followed when the project faltered and Lurie initially claimed some payments were salary but later settled, executing a $7.5 million note to Steven in 1987–88.
- Patricia relies principally on two 1987 affidavits by Lurie that (she contends) show $3 million was routed back to Steven in late 1986/early 1987 and thus was hidden from her during divorce negotiations and the 1988 financial disclosures.
- The 1988 Financial Statement provided to Patricia disclosed the Lurie Investment and noted pending litigation with Lurie; Patricia’s counsel had documents about the Lurie Litigation in their files, though Patricia later asserted she did not know of that litigation until 2008.
- The Second Circuit remanded Patricia’s fraud and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims; after further discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, holding Patricia lacked admissible, clear-and-convincing evidence of fraud, unreasonably relied given the disclosures/waiver in the separation agreement, and was time-barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fraud (material misrepresentation/omission about Lurie repayments) | Patricia contends Lurie’s affidavits show $3M was repaid to Steven and hidden, so Steven misrepresented his net assets. | Defendants argue the Lurie affidavits are unreliable/hearsay, later withdrawn, and produce no admissible evidence that Steven concealed assets or changed his net position. | Court: No material misrepresentation proven; Lurie affidavits inadmissible/unreliable and cannot meet clear-and-convincing standard. |
| Reasonable reliance on alleged misstatements/omissions | Patricia says she relied on Steven’s disclosures and settlement terms in accepting the separation agreement. | Defendants note the Lurie Investment and litigation were disclosed and the agreement contained explicit disclaimers and waivers of further discovery; reliance was unreasonable. | Court: Reliance was unreasonable given disclosure and explicit waiver clauses; estoppel to claim reliance. |
| Statute of limitations / inquiry notice | Patricia claims she only discovered the Lurie file in 2008, so her 2009 suit is timely. | Defendants show Patricia suspected fraud by 2006, her counsel had documents re: Lurie litigation, and the public record and counsel knowledge put her on inquiry notice earlier. | Court: Claims time-barred—Plaintiff was on inquiry notice before the limitations cutoff; suit untimely. |
| Breach of fiduciary duty / aiding and abetting | Patricia asserts Steven breached fiduciary duties by concealing assets; Donald aided and abetted. | Defendants argue (as with fraud) no proof of material concealment, and the claim is also time-barred; aiding and abetting fails if primary breach fails. | Court: Grant for defendants; fiduciary and aiding/abetting claims fail on the merits and statute of limitations. |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden and procedure)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (nonmovant must show more than metaphysical doubt to avoid summary judgment)
- Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc., 88 N.Y.2d 413 (N.Y. law on elements of fraud claim)
- Century Pac., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 528 F. Supp. 2d 206 (clear-and-convincing proof required for fraud at summary judgment)
- Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597 (effect of contractual disclaimer/estoppel to assert fraud claims)
- Salinger v. Projectavision, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 1402 (inquiry notice can be decided as a matter of law)
- Veal v. Geraci, 23 F.3d 722 (party charged with knowledge of counsel's knowledge)
