Cohen v. Chicago Park District
2017 IL 121800
| Ill. | 2018Background
- Plaintiff Isaac Cohen fell while bicycling on Chicago’s Lakefront Trail when his front wheel caught in a 3–4 inch wide, 2–3 inch deep crack; he sustained shoulder injuries and later observed the crack had been repaired.
- The Lakefront Trail is an 18.51-mile shared-use recreational path owned and maintained by the Chicago Park District; it is closed to public motorized traffic.
- Park District personnel were told about the crack by a user no earlier than May 2013; an employee inspected it, placed it on the rapid-response repair list, and the repair was completed July 10, 2013.
- Plaintiff sued the Park District alleging willful and wanton failure to maintain the trail. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Park District based on statutory immunity; the appellate court reversed.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave, held section 3-107(a) (blanket immunity for certain "roads") inapplicable because the Trail is not a ‘‘road’’ for motor vehicle travel, but affirmed summary judgment under section 3-106 (immunity for recreational property unless conduct is willful and wanton).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether section 3-107(a) blanket immunity applies | Trail is an access road and covered by section 3-107(a) | Trail is not a "road" providing motor-vehicle access; section 3-107(a) therefore inapplicable | Not applicable: Lakefront Trail is not a "road" under section 3-107(a) because it is closed to motorized traffic |
| Whether section 3-106 recreational-immunity bars suit absent willful and wanton conduct | Park District acted with willful and wanton indifference by failing to barricade or temporarily fix the crack | Park District inspected, listed the defect for repair, and repaired it within the rapid-response process—no willful and wanton conduct as a matter of law | Park District entitled to summary judgment: its conduct did not rise to willful and wanton; jury question unnecessary |
| Proper use of Highway Code definitions in interpreting Tort Immunity Act | (implicit) Plaintiff argued the statute should not be so narrowly read as to import motor-vehicle-specific definitions | The Court argued it is appropriate to import Highway Code definitions to define "road" in section 3-107(a) | Court applied Highway Code definitions to construe "road" as permitting motorized vehicles |
| Standard for willful and wanton on summary judgment | Plaintiff: disputed facts and inferences (delay, failure to warn) preclude summary judgment | Defendant: undisputed repair steps and timeline make willful and wanton impossible as matter of law | Held that given inspections, inclusion on repair list, bidding and completion within ~30 days, conduct was at most negligence, not willful and wanton |
Key Cases Cited
- Corbett v. County of Lake, 2017 IL 121536 (defining shared-use path context)
- Murray v. Chicago Youth Center, 224 Ill. 2d 213 (willful and wanton generally a jury question)
- Palmer v. Chicago Park District, 277 Ill. App. 3d 282 (failure to act on an obvious, extraordinary hazard can show willful and wanton conduct)
- Lester v. Chicago Park District, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1054 (post-discovery remedial acts do not equate to willful and wanton conduct)
- Fooden v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 48 Ill. 2d 580 (summary judgment appropriate when no factual issue remains for jury)