293 P.3d 752
Kan.2013Background
- Battaglia owned 20% of BDC and 2222 BAG shares; sold BDC stock to Cass and the Cohen Trust plus a Redención Transaction with a secured promissory note; pledge secured Battaglia’s interest; termination date released consent requirements after obligations performed.
- Cohen and Cass trusts later sold 100% of BDC and BAG assets to Group 1 Automotive; sale required Battaglia’s consent only if his security interest remained, which depended on note performance.
- Battaglia filed a Missouri action alleging trustees breached fiduciary duties and manipulated BAG/BDC; he sent Group 1 a copy of the petition and invited inquiry.
- Group 1 postponed closing and demanded indemnification, escrow, and adjustments; the trustees incurred substantial attorney fees.
- District court dismissed the tortious interference claims with reference to Restatement § 773; Court of Appeals affirmed on a different ground under Restatement § 772; trustees sought review of § 772 adoption and its application.
- This Court reverses and remands, holding the panel improperly resolved factual issues on a dispositive motion and that § 772’s application to Accurso’s conduct could not be determined on dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §772 should govern Kansas tortious interference claims. | Trustees: adopt §772(a) and dismissal appropriate. | Battaglia: §772 governs disclosures; information may be privileged. | No, adopt §772 invalid here; remand for factual development. |
| Whether Accurso’s dissemination of the Missouri action to Group 1 was actionable under §772(a). | Trustees: communication interfered with Group 1’s closing. | Battaglia: disclosure of a true suit is non-actionable. | Factual dispute; dismissal improper on §772; remand. |
| Whether the Missouri action could be the basis for tortious interference given early-stage facts. | Trustees relied on petition–allegations. | Battaglia: suit cannot support liability if contested. | Dispositive factual issues require reexamination on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. Halliburton Co., 240 Kan. 1, 722 P.2d 1106 (1986) (Kan. 1986) (seven-factor test for improper interference; privilege/justification considerations)
- ARY Jewelers v. Krigel, 277 Kan. 27, 82 P.3d 460 (2003) (Kan. 2003) (fact-specific inquiry; early-stage litigation facts unresolved on motion to dismiss)
- Seaboard Corp. v. Marsh Inc., 295 Kan. 384, 284 P.3d 314 (2012) (Kan. 2012) (facts cannot be resolved to resolve disputes on motion to dismiss)
- Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 281 Kan. 844, 137 P.3d 486 (2006) (Kan. 2006) (issues not raised in petition for review not considered)
- Osterhaus v. Toth, 291 Kan. 759, 249 P.3d 888 (2011) (Kan. 2011) (summary judgments generally defer to well-pleaded facts)
