Cohan v. Medical Imaging Consultants
297 Neb. 111
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 2008–2010 Mary Cohan had breast complaints and mammograms; a 2009 screening read as normal but a 2010 exam revealed a 7.1 cm cancer with metastasis to 19/24 lymph nodes.
- Plaintiffs (Mary and husband Terry) sued imaging/radiology providers and the OB/GYN practice/PA, alleging negligent failure to detect cancer in 2009 caused delayed treatment, greater morbidity, increased recurrence risk, shortened life expectancy, pain and suffering, and loss of consortium.
- Plaintiffs presented expert testimony that the 2009 tumor was likely ~3.5 cm with ~3 positive nodes, that earlier diagnosis would more likely than not have found the cancer in 2009, and that 10‑year distant recurrence risk would have been ~30% in 2009 versus ~75% in 2010.
- At the close of plaintiffs’ case, defendants moved for directed verdicts; the district court granted directed verdicts dismissing both claims, ruling Nebraska does not recognize the loss‑of‑chance doctrine and that plaintiffs offered only loss‑of‑chance evidence for causation/damages.
- On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court declined to adopt the loss‑of‑chance doctrine but held plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence under traditional proximate‑cause rules to submit Mary’s damages claim (emotional distress, pain/suffering, worsened prognosis) to a jury; Terry’s consortium claim failed for lack of evidence.
- The Court affirmed reversal as to Terry, reversed the directed verdict as to Mary, and remanded for a new trial; it also upheld the trial court’s limited admission of Dr. Naughton’s testimony for the purpose of showing that earlier detection improves prognosis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nebraska should adopt the loss‑of‑chance doctrine | Cohans: Nebraska should recognize loss‑of‑chance so diminished probability of a better outcome is compensable | Appellees: Loss‑of‑chance would lower causation standard to mere possibility and expand liability | Court: Declines to adopt loss‑of‑chance or Restatement §323; Nebraska requires traditional proximate‑cause proof |
| Whether plaintiffs proved causation and damages for Mary sufficient to avoid directed verdict | Cohans: Expert testimony showed negligent failure to detect in 2009 caused tumor growth, more nodal spread, worse prognosis and emotional/physical injuries | Defendants: Evidence only established loss‑of‑chance (not recognized) and speculative future harm | Court: Giving plaintiff every inference, evidence was sufficient on causation/damages for Mary to go to jury; directed verdict for Mary reversed |
| Whether Terry presented sufficient loss of consortium damages | Terry: Loss of consortium shares in Mary’s injuries and emotional harms | Defendants: No specific evidence quantifying Terry’s damages or causal link to defendants’ negligence | Court: Directed verdict for Terry affirmed—insufficient evidence of his damages |
| Admissibility of Dr. Naughton’s testimony about recurrence risk and prognosis | Plaintiffs: Testimony relevant to show earlier detection leads to better prognosis and corroborates causation/damages | Defendants: Testimony impermissibly put forward loss‑of‑chance theory and focused on risks not current condition | Court: Trial court did not abuse discretion; testimony admissible for the limited purpose of showing earlier discovery likely yields improved prognosis, though evidence solely supporting loss‑of‑chance would be improper on retrial |
Key Cases Cited
- Scheele v. Rains, 292 Neb. 974 (discussing directed‑verdict review standard)
- Rankin v. Stetson, 275 Neb. 775 (stating Nebraska has not recognized loss‑of‑chance)
- Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 452 Mass. 1 (Massachusetts decision recognizing loss‑of‑chance concept)
- Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1993) (criticizing loss‑of‑chance as reducing causation to mere possibility)
- David v. DeLeon, 250 Neb. 109 (explaining plaintiff must first prove proximate cause before jurors may apportion damages)
