Cody R. Hickman v. State of Indiana
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 320
Ind. Ct. App.2017Background
- Hickman pleaded guilty to burglary/theft and admitted a probation violation; was sentenced in Dec 2012 with four years supervised probation to follow.
- As a condition of probation he entered Grant County’s reentry-court program and stayed for a period at Grace House (a halfway-house–type residential program) with Phase 1 curfew and sign-out rules.
- While in the program (Jan 2015–Oct 2016) Hickman had multiple rule violations, positive drug tests, new criminal convictions, and absconded for two months; the State petitioned to revoke his reentry participation and later his probation.
- At the probation-revocation hearing the trial court revoked probation, ordered execution of the suspended sentence, credited 78 days of jail time but denied credit for time spent at Grace House as “accrued time.”
- Hickman appealed, arguing his residence at Grace House constituted confinement/imprisonment entitling him to accrued time credit; the Court of Appeals reviewed de novo whether statutory criteria for accrued time were met and whether the trial court abused discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether time at Grace House qualifies as "accrued time" (confinement/imprisonment) | State: Grace House was not confinement; trial court properly denied accrued-time credit | Hickman: Grace House placement and curfew substantially restricted liberty and thus constituted confinement entitling him to accrued time | Held: No accrued time — Grace House stay did not rise to confinement/imprisonment under controlling factors |
| Whether placement at Grace House was involuntary | State: Hickman failed to show placement at Grace House was mandatory | Hickman: Placement was part of mandatory reentry-court condition | Held: Court found record did not show Grace House placement was involuntary or mandatory |
| Whether restrictions (curfew/sign-out) demonstrated sufficient loss of liberty | State: Restrictions were limited, not zealously enforced, and were modifiable for work; Hickman had significant freedom | Hickman: Curfew and sign-out rules substantially limited movement and autonomy | Held: Restrictions were minor or loosely enforced and insufficient to establish confinement |
| Whether degree of state supervision and loss of privacy supported confinement finding | State: No evidence Grace House acted as a state actor with close supervision | Hickman: Participation in reentry court implies state control sufficient for confinement | Held: Record showed limited supervision and autonomy remained; no confinement established |
Key Cases Cited
- Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. 2013) (standard of review for probation revocation and discretion limits)
- Purdue v. State, 51 N.E.3d 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (accrued time is statutory right; court must award if entitlement shown)
- Capes v. State, 634 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1994) (substantial control short of incarceration can constitute confinement)
- Senn v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (home detention and work release constitute confinement for credit)
- Reed v. State, 844 N.E.2d 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (daily-reporting probation does not warrant accrued-time credit)
- Oswalt v. State, 749 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (not every halfway house is a penal facility; voluntariness and supervision are relevant)
- Roll v. State, 473 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (a particular halfway house held to be a penal facility in context)