Cochran v. State
305 Ga. 827
| Ga. | 2019Background
- Victim Melony Strickland was last seen with appellant Johnny Ray Cochran in Americus, GA after surveillance recorded a silver sedan (like one Cochran had borrowed) parked next to her and then leaving with her in her truck; she was later found shot to death in her locked home.
- Cell-phone records placed Cochran traveling to and from Americus the evening/night in question and show numerous calls to Strickland; Cochran returned home acting oddly and asked to "hide" his vehicle at his ex-wife's house.
- Ballistics linked a rare type of bullet recovered from the victim to similar bullets found in the home of Cochran's mother; the murder weapon resembled a gun reportedly stolen from Cochran’s former girlfriend and last seen at his mother’s house.
- No forcible entry, struggle, or theft at the scene; victim wore same clothing seen on surveillance the night she disappeared; no dispositive DNA evidence tied Cochran to the crime.
- Indictment (2008) charged malice murder, felony murder (aggravated assault), aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony; jury convicted on all counts in 2010; life plus consecutive five years. Trial counsel later deceased; motion for new trial denied.
Issues
| Issue | Cochran's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence (circumstantial-only case) | Evidence was circumstantial and did not exclude reasonable hypotheses (e.g., death occurred after Cochran left Americus) | Circumstantial evidence (surveillance, cell records, ballistics, actions after return) was sufficient to exclude reasonable hypotheses and support conviction | Evidence sufficient under Jackson; jury could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt |
| Failure to subpoena Officer Bolden | Bolden would have testified about a prowler whose description did not match Cochran, undermining prosecution | Other witnesses and testimony about prowler were presented; Bolden’s testimony would have been cumulative | No ineffective assistance; no prejudice shown |
| Withdrawal of "mere presence" jury instruction | Jurors should have been instructed that mere presence is insufficient to convict | Defense strategy reasonably avoided the instruction because it might imply presence at scene; the court fully instructed on elements and circumstantial evidence | No ineffective assistance; tactical choice and no prejudice |
| Failure to request voluntary manslaughter instruction | Relationship evidence (strain, erratic behavior) supported heat-of-passion theory | Evidence showed long-standing antagonism, not sudden irresistible passion required for voluntary manslaughter | No ineffective assistance; no evidentiary basis for the charge |
| Failure to object to portions of prosecutor's closing (two remarks) | Remarks improperly vouched for prosecutor's credibility and disparaged defense counsel | Remarks were permissible rebuttal and fair comment on defense theory; within prosecutorial latitude | No ineffective assistance; comments not improper and objections not required |
Key Cases Cited
- Akhimie v. State, 297 Ga. 801, 777 S.E.2d 683 (Ga. 2015) (circumstantial-evidence standard: exclude every reasonable hypothesis but accused's guilt)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (evidence insufficient only if no rational trier could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standards for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (U.S. 2011) (strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within wide range of reasonable professional assistance)
- Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505, 796 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. 2017) (no requirement that State rely on particular type of forensic evidence)
- Black v. State, 296 Ga. 658, 769 S.E.2d 898 (Ga. 2015) (expert testimony limits on estimating time of death and factors affecting rigor mortis)