Cochran v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.
2017 IL 121200
Ill.2018Background
- Walter Cochran died and his body was sent to Memorial Medical Center’s morgue, where Securitas employees (the hospital’s contracted security) received and stored the body in a sealed Ziegler case without a visible identification tag or label.
- Securitas employees misrecorded the corpse’s identity in the morgue logbook as another decedent (William Carroll) and, relying solely on the erroneous log entry, released Walter’s body to Butler Funeral Home without visually confirming identity.
- Butler removed and cremated the wrong body before the error was discovered; consequently no autopsy was performed and no cause of death was determined.
- Walter’s mother, Donna Cochran, sued (after settling with the hospital and funeral home) alleging tortious interference with the right to possess a corpse, claiming Securitas breached duties (industry/hospital standards, identification, logging, release procedures) and caused severe emotional distress and financial loss.
- The trial court dismissed the third amended complaint under section 2-615; the appellate court reversed, and the Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to decide whether wilful and wanton misconduct must be alleged for this tort or whether ordinary negligence suffices.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a claim for tortious interference with the right to possess a corpse requires allegations of wilful and wanton misconduct, or whether ordinary negligence can support recovery (including emotional distress damages). | Cochran: The tort is an independent wrong; emotional distress is an element of damages for that tort and is recoverable on an ordinary-negligence theory. | Securitas: Illinois precedent requires wilful and wanton misconduct to recover emotional distress for interference with a corpse; plaintiff failed to plead such conduct or a duty owed. | Held: Recovery is available on an ordinary negligence theory. Wilful and wanton allegations are not required; the complaint adequately pleaded duty, breach, proximate cause, and emotional distress as damages for the tort. |
Key Cases Cited
- Leno v. St. Joseph Hospital, 55 Ill.2d 114 (Ill. 1973) (recognizes next of kin’s right of possession of a decedent’s remains and recovery for mental suffering caused by interference)
- Mensinger v. O’Hara, 189 Ill. App. 48 (Ill. App. 1914) (early case acknowledging cause of action for interference with remains but did not decide whether wilful and wanton misconduct is required)
- Courtney v. St. Joseph Hospital, 149 Ill. App. 3d 397 (Ill. App. 1986) (applied NIED restrictions to bar negligent-mishandling-of-corpse claims under zone-of-danger/impact rule)
- Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill.2d 546 (Ill. 1983) (adopted zone-of-danger rule for bystander NIED claims; historically restricted recovery for purely emotional harm)
- Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 117 Ill.2d 230 (Ill. 1987) (applied Rickey reasoning to bar certain emotional-distress damages; later limited by Clark)
- Clark v. Children’s Memorial Hospital, 2011 IL 108656 (Ill. 2011) (overruled Siemieniec to the extent it applied zone-of-danger to claims where emotional distress is an element of damages for an underlying tort; allowed emotional damages as part of tort recovery)