Cochran v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.
405 Ill. Dec. 941
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- In Sept. 2010 Donna Cochran’s adult son (the decedent) died; his body was sent to Memorial Medical Center for autopsy and stored in the morgue.
- On Sept. 16, 2010, Butler Funeral Home mistakenly received and later cremated the decedent’s body that had been misidentified as another person.
- Cochran sued Memorial, Butler, and Securitas (the hospital’s contracted security vendor) alleging interference with her right as next of kin to possession of her son’s remains; she later settled with Memorial and Butler and proceeded against Securitas alone.
- Cochran’s third amended complaint alleged Securitas employees were responsible for receiving, tagging, logging, and releasing bodies; they failed to place/verify identification tags, misrecorded the morgue log, and released the wrong body to Butler, causing emotional harm.
- Securitas moved to dismiss under section 2-615 and 2-619; it attached various documents but submitted no affidavits. The trial court dismissed with prejudice, finding Cochran failed and could not allege a duty owed by Securitas.
- The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding dismissal under section 2-619 was improper and that Cochran adequately pleaded a negligence-based claim for interference with possession of a decedent’s body (including proximate cause).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly granted dismissal under §2-619 based on documents attached to defendant’s motion | Cochran argued defendant failed to support its §2-619 motion with required affidavits and the attachments were not properly before the court | Securitas relied on attachments to its motion and urged dismissal | Court: §2-619 dismissal improper because defendant filed no affidavits and did not present an affirmative matter defeating the claim; attachments were not considered |
| Whether a cause of action for interference with right to possession of remains requires willful & wanton conduct (not ordinary negligence) | Cochran argued modern law permits ordinary negligence claims for negligent mishandling of corpses causing emotional distress | Securitas argued Mensinger and later IL cases require willful and wanton conduct; ordinary negligence is insufficient | Court: Recognized negligence (without aggravating willful/wanton conduct) can support interference/ emotional-distress claims for mishandling remains; willful/wanton not categorically required |
| Whether Cochran pleaded sufficient facts to state negligence (duty, breach) against Securitas | Cochran alleged Securitas had duties (tagging, logging, verifying, releasing) and breached hospital security policies causing misidentification and release | Securitas asserted complaint lacked facts showing a duty and that proximate cause was alleged | Court: Allegations that Securitas received, logged, tagged, and released bodies and failed to follow procedures adequately pleaded duty and breach for negligence |
| Whether proximate cause was sufficiently pleaded | Cochran argued Securitas’s failures to follow procedures were a substantial factor and foreseeable cause of wrongful disposition and emotional harm | Securitas contended Cochran failed to plead cause in fact and legal causation | Court: Cochran adequately pleaded proximate cause — Securitas’s alleged failures were a substantial factor and the resulting harm was foreseeable |
Key Cases Cited
- Leno v. St. Joseph Hospital, 55 Ill.2d 114 (recognizes next of kin’s right to possession of remains for disposition)
- Mensinger v. O’Hara, 189 Ill. App. 48 (early authority discussing actionable wrong for willful/wanton infringement of right to possession)
- Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill.2d 546 (modern treatment of negligent infliction of emotional distress and relaxation of impact rule)
- Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill.2d 296 (direct victim may recover emotional-distress damages without physical manifestation)
- Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73 (explains jurors’ ability to assess emotional distress; cited in evolution of emotional-distress law)