356 So.3d 1174
La. Ct. App.2023Background
- Coastal Development Group purchased a 99% undivided interest in 3420–3422 Bienville Ave. at a 2018 tax sale and recorded the tax-sale certificate.
- Coastal filed to quiet title and partition in June 2020; it alleged the property was blighted and thus subject to an 18-month redemption period under La. Const. art. VII, §25(B)(2).
- Christopher Lund (owner of the remaining 1%) was served and filed an answer in December 2020 but did not redeem the property or oppose Coastal’s April 2021 partial summary judgment motion; he did not appear at the November 2021 hearing.
- The trial court granted partial summary judgment declaring Coastal the owner of the 99% interest; Lund later (April 2022) moved for a new trial arguing disputes over whether an 18‑month or three‑year redemption period applied and that his answer suspended redemption.
- The trial court denied the new-trial motion; the court of appeal affirmed, holding (1) the blighted condition supported application of the 18‑month period and (2) Lund’s answer did not suspend or interrupt the peremptive redemption period (and in any event Lund never redeemed before peremption).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Coastal) | Defendant's Argument (Lund) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which redemption period applied: 18 months (blighted) or 3 years (tax sale)? | Property remained blighted at sale so the 18‑month redemptive period applies; even if 3 years applied, Lund did not redeem before peremption. | Genuine factual dispute exists whether sale was under general tax statute (3 years) vs blight statute (18 months); Flag Boy supports applying 3 years. | Court affirmed: blighted condition unabated supports 18 months; even if 3 years applied Lund failed to redeem before peremption. |
| Did Lund’s December 2020 answer interrupt or suspend the peremptive redemption period? | An answer that does not demand redemption does not initiate redemption or suspend peremption; Harris distinguished. | The answer should suspend/interruput peremption (or equity should apply) as in Harris/Guardian Funds. | Court held Lund’s answer did not interrupt or suspend peremption; Harris is distinguishable because plaintiffs there actively sought redemption. |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Witt, 851 So.2d 1119 (La. 2003) (motion for new trial reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Smith v. Brumfield, 133 So.3d 70 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2014) (redemption periods in the Louisiana Constitution are peremptive)
- Harris v. Estate of Fuller, 532 So.2d 1367 (La. 1988) (peremption extinguishes the cause of action; constitutional redemption periods are peremptive)
- Naghi v. Brener, 17 So.3d 919 (La. 2009) (distinguishing peremption from prescription; peremption cannot be interrupted)
- Harris v. Guardian Funds, Inc., 425 So.2d 1322 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (suit seeking redemption may constitute initiation of redemption under equitable circumstances)