Clukey v. Town of Camden, 717 F.3d 52

Clukey, a longtime Camden Police Department dispatcher, was laid off when the department was eliminated in 2007; he was the most senior employee in his unit at the time.
The Town and the Fraternal Order of Police; Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) Article 19 and Article 7 govern recall rights and grievance procedures.
Article 19 provides recall rights “according to seniority” for twelve months from layoff, with separate treatment for police and dispatcher functions.
Two police department positions opened within 12 months (Administrative Assistant and Parking Enforcement Officer) that Clukey qualified for, but he was not recalled and those positions were filled by new hires.
Clukey and his wife filed § 1983 procedural due process claims alleging lack of notice and opportunity to be heard; the district court dismissed, holding no cognizable § 1983 claim because state-law contract remedies might suffice.
The First Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that Clukey plausibly had a property interest in recall and that the lack of notice could state a due process claim, with the district court to conduct further Mathews analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Clukey had a constitutionally protected property interest in recall.	Clukey had a state-law-based entitlement to recall under Article 19.	Town argues recall is discretionary and the language narrowly limits recall.	Clukey has a protectable property interest in recall.
What process is due to Clukey under Mathews v. Eldridge.	Due process requires notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.	Procedures may vary; post-deprivation procedures could suffice.	Notice and opportunity to be heard are required; unresolved on remand for full Mathews analysis.
Whether availability of state-law contract remedies forecloses § 1983 claim.	State-law breach-of-contract claim does not foreclose § 1983 procedural due process claim.	Ramírez v. Arlequín supports foreclosure when only contract remedies exist.	Availability of contract remedies does not foreclose § 1983 claim.
Whether grievance procedures in the CBA foreclose § 1983 claim.	CBA procedures are insufficient to extinguish due process rights.	Post-deprivation remedies could satisfy due process if constitutional minima are met.	CBA grievance procedures do not shield from § 1983 if they fail constitutional due process; remand for record.

Loudermill v. City of Cleveland, 470 U.S. 532 (U.S. 1985) (public employment property interests require notice and hearing)
Mard v. Town of Amherst, 350 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 2003) (public employees may have protected property interests in benefits under state law)
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (U.S. 2005) (state discretion to withhold benefits affects whether a contractual benefit is 'property')
Lujan v. G. & G. Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189 (U.S. 2001) (precludes full protection of a right by ordinary contract claim when seeking to pursue gainful occupation)
Laborde-Garcia v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 993 F.2d 265 (1st Cir. 1993) (statutory recall-like rights can create legitimate entitlement to continued employment)
Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2002) (contractual ambiguity; pre-deprivation process required where warranted)
Concepción Chaparro v. Ruiz-Hernández, 607 F.3d 261 (1st Cir. 2010) (public employee property interests in employment protected under §1983)
Cotnoir v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 35 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 1994) (grievance mechanisms do not replace constitutional due process)
Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div. of Reg'l Transp. Auth., 52 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995) (CBAs cannot satisfy due process when they fail to provide pre-deprivation process)