Clukey v. Town of Camden, 797 F.3d 97

Alan Clukey was a Camden police dispatcher for 31 years and was laid off on June 30, 2007; he did not submit a post‑layoff written mailing address/phone number to the Town Manager.
The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) Article 19 §3 grants twelve months recall rights and states: the affected employee “shall file in writing his or her mailing address and telephone number” with the Town Manager and “shall be obligated, as a condition of his/her recall rights for said twelve (12) month period, to continue to inform the Town Manager in writing of any change thereafter.”
During the twelve‑month recall period, positions opened for which Clukey was qualified, but the Town neither recalled him nor notified him that he was not selected.
Clukey sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a procedural‑due‑process violation based on deprivation of his property interest in recall; his state claims were later dismissed.
This Court previously held (Clukey I) that the CBA created a property interest and remanded; on remand the district court granted summary judgment to the Town, ruling the filing requirement was a condition precedent to recall rights.
On this appeal the First Circuit reviews, de novo, whether the CBA’s filing requirement is an unambiguous condition precedent; it finds the provision ambiguous and remands for factfinding.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the CBA requires post‑layoff written filing of address/phone as a condition precedent to recall rights	Clukey: the CBA only requires that the Town have the employee's contact info (could have been provided earlier); only updates are expressly conditioned	Town: the term "affected employee" and mandatory "shall file in writing" mean the employee must submit contact info after layoff as notice of interest; failure forfeits recall rights	The provision is ambiguous as to timing/purpose; reasonable interpretations support both sides; remanded for factfinding on parties' intent

Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing condition precedent concept)
Ramírez v. Arlequín, 447 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2006) (limits §1983 claims that are purely contract breaches)
Grand Wireless, Inc. v. Verizon Wireless, Inc., 748 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (de novo review of contract interpretation)
Acadia Ins. Co. v. Buck Constr. Co., 756 A.2d 515 (Me. 2000) (give force to all contract provisions; avoid rendering provisions meaningless)
Irving v. Town of Clinton, 711 A.2d 141 (Me. 1998) (nonoccurrence of condition precedent discharges duties)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (framework for due‑process procedures)