248 A.3d 132
D.C.2021Background
- In 2017 a D.C. couple wired $1.57 million in a real-estate closing; Federal Title said it never received the funds and reported its systems had been hacked. The buyers sued in federal court under RICO; that federal case was dismissed and later voluntarily dismissed with prejudice in state court mediation.
- Plaintiffs here (Federal Title and its owner Ewing) sued attorney Michael Nadel, his firm McDermott Will & Emery, and the buyers (Smith and Wrona) in Superior Court for defamation, false light, and tortious interference based on Nadel’s statements to WAMU that Federal Title “either caused our money to be stolen or stole it” and that it “seemed like they knew well in advance.” McDermott Will reposted the WAMU story on its website.
- Federal Title demanded a retraction; defendants refused. Plaintiffs alleged reputational and substantial financial harm (realtors/lenders terminated relationships; revenues plunged).
- The Superior Court granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal (finding Nadel’s statements not capable of defamatory meaning and the tortious-interference pleading defective) and granted defendants’ Anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, awarding defendants attorneys’ fees.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of defamation and false-light claims, reversed dismissal of tortious-interference claim (finding plaintiffs adequately pleaded business relationships, notice, intentional interference, and damages), and reversed the Anti-SLAPP dismissal and fee awards (holding defendants failed to make the prima facie showing that the challenged statements were acts in furtherance of advocacy on an issue of public interest).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Defamation | Nadel accused Federal Title (and implicitly Ewing) of stealing/causing theft, harming reputation and business. | Statements were attorney advocacy/theory, opinion or conjecture in context and not capable of defamatory meaning (and privileged). | Dismissed — statements viewed in context were nonactionable expression of a theory, not provable false assertions. |
| False light invasion | Same factual basis as defamation; placed plaintiffs in a highly offensive false light. | False-light fails for same reasons as defamation; corporation cannot assert personal-privacy false-light claim. | Dismissed — duplicative of defamation and not established. |
| Tortious interference with business relations | Plaintiffs alleged longstanding contractual/business relationships with lenders, insurers, brokers and buyers, provided notice of harm, and alleged resulting lost business and tens of millions in damages. | Complaint failed to identify specific relationships or plead intent with sufficient factual detail. | Reversed dismissal — pleadings sufficiently alleged existence of business relationships, defendants’ knowledge and intentional interference, and damages. Case remanded. |
| Anti‑SLAPP special motion & fee award | Plaintiffs: defendants’ speech was primarily private/commercial advocacy for clients, not protected public-interest advocacy, so Anti‑SLAPP inapplicable. | Defendants: statements were made in a public forum and concerned cybercrime/title services/a pending judicial matter, satisfying prima facie Anti‑SLAPP standard; fees appropriate. | Reversed — defendants did not meet prima facie burden that the statements were acts in furtherance of advocacy on an issue of public interest (statements were directed primarily to a private dispute); fee awards vacated. |
Key Cases Cited
- Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531 (D.C. 2011) (Rule 12(b)(6) pleading and plausibility standards)
- Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219 (D.C. 2011) (pleading factual allegations must be presumed true and liberally construed)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Solers, Inc. v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009) (elements of defamation claim)
- Guilford Trans. Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580 (D.C. 2000) (distinguishing statements of theory/opinion from verifiably false factual assertions)
- Klayman v. Segal, 783 A.2d 607 (D.C. 2001) (false-light standard and overlap with defamation)
- Whitt v. Am. Prop. Constr., P.C., 157 A.3d 196 (D.C. 2017) (elements and intent/substantial-certainty standard for tortious interference)
- Competitive Enterprise Institute v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213 (D.C. 2016) (Anti‑SLAPP framework and prima facie showing requirement)