Clister Ray Thomas v. State, 411 S.W.3d 685

Thomas, previously convicted of aggravated sexual assault, was required to register as a sex offender for life and verify annually.
In March 2012, Thomas moved to Gregg County and registered an address at 1900 South Green St., Apt. 210, Longview, which was the apartment of Ashanti Jimerson and occasionally inhabited by Pamela Epsy, his girlfriend.
Thomas was placed under a criminal trespass warning for the apartment on April 3, 2012, prohibiting his return to the property.
On June 13, 2012, police arrested Thomas for failing to update his address; the arrest stemmed from a discrepancy between his registered address and the address listed in jail records (Houston Street 1703) after he had already been warned not to stay at the apartment.
Thomas admitted that he lied about his address to police to protect his family, and he never formally changed his sex-offender registration to Houston Street while acknowledging he remained registered at South Green Street.
The State charged Thomas with failing to report an anticipated address change seven days before the move, but the jury was instructed to contemplate the formal elements of failure to report a change of address, and the indictment alleged only the seven-day before-change requirement. The trial court ultimately entered a judgment of conviction, which the court of appeals reversed, acquitting Thomas based on legal insufficiency due to a material variance between indictment and proof.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the evidence legally sufficient to prove failure to report seven days before an address change?	Thomas argues no proof of seven-day advance notice.	State contends evidence satisfied seven-day notice requirement under the indictment.	No; evidence legally insufficient to prove seven-day advance notice.
Did a material variance exist between indictment and proof?	Thomas asserts the indictment alleged seven-day advance notice, but proof showed no intent to move seven days prior.	State argues the indictment’s method was one of several possible methods and was proven.	Yes, material variance; indictment limited to seven-day before-change method and proof did not establish that method.
Was the State required to prove a narrowed method of violation defined by the indictment?	Geick-style requirement that the law as authorized by the indictment limits proof to the pled method.	State contends it proved a valid method within the statute’s scope.	Yes; the State had to prove the specific method pled in the indictment, seven-day before-change notice.

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (standard for legal sufficiency review)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1980) (factors for sufficiency standard)
Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (material vs immaterial variance; hypothetically correct charge)
Geick v. State, 349 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (indictment defines offense element; narrowed method required)
Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (variance involving non-statutory allegations)
Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (article 62.055(a) creates duty to notify before or after change of address)
Walmer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007) (distinguishes absence of material variance where evidence supports failure to notify seven days before change)
Green v. State, 350 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011) (trigger of seven-day advance-notice requirement when offender intends to change address)