13 F. Supp. 3d 868
M.D. Tenn.2014Background
- Plaintiffs KC (mother) and EC (minor) allege that KC’s husband, Army soldier Joshua Matthew Cline (JMC), sexually assaulted and produced child pornography of EC in 2008; Army investigators later seized evidence.
- Plaintiffs contend Army agents knew or should have known of JMC’s danger, failed to warn or otherwise protect KC and EC, and failed to report the abuse — causing further assaults and emotional injuries.
- Plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence (including per se), and failure to warn.
- The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (FTCA exceptions) and for failure to state a claim.
- The government argued Section 2680(h)’s intentional-tort exception bars these claims as they “arise from” JMC’s intentional assaults; plaintiffs later invoked Tennessee’s mandatory child‑abuse reporting statute (T.C.A. § 37‑1‑403) as an independent duty (not pleaded in the complaint).
- The court concluded the complaint pleads only duties tied to JMC’s employment relationship and, therefore, the intentional‑tort exception bars jurisdiction; dismissal without prejudice granted and 14 days’ leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court has subject‑matter jurisdiction under FTCA given § 2680(h) (intentional‑tort exception) | Plaintiffs seek recovery for government negligence in failing to warn/protect/report; claim not barred because it asserts independent duties to protect family members | United States: claims "arise from" JMC’s intentional sexual assaults and thus fall within § 2680(h) — no waiver of sovereign immunity | Held: Complaint framed as negligent supervision/related to employment; claims arise from assaults and are barred by § 2680(h); dismissal for lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether plaintiffs stated an independent duty under Tennessee law (T.C.A. § 37‑1‑403) in the Complaint | Plaintiffs later (in opposing brief) argue Tennessee law imposes an affirmative duty to report child abuse, creating an independent duty the government breached | United States: factual evidence shows Army did not learn of child‑pornography/abuse until Jan 2009; plaintiffs did not plead this statutory duty in the Complaint and submitted no evidence on jurisdiction | Held: Plaintiffs did not plead the Tennessee statutory duty in the Complaint; court declines to consider that new theory on Rule 12(b)(1) facial challenge and dismisses under § 2680(h) |
| Whether Sheridan/Shearer line of cases permit negligence claims for failure to prevent an assault by a government employee | Plaintiffs rely on theory that the government negligently failed to warn/protect from foreseeable danger (Sheridan-type duty) | United States: Shearer and its progeny bar negligence claims that are essentially negligent supervision/retention tied to employment status | Held: Because the pleaded claims derive from the employment relationship and the assault, Shearer line controls; intentional‑tort exception applies; Sheridan does not save the complaint absent an independent duty pleaded |
| Remedy and next steps | Plaintiffs seek to proceed on FTCA negligence/failure‑to‑warn claims | United States seeks dismissal | Held: Dismissal granted without prejudice; plaintiffs given 14 days to amend complaint to allege any independent duty properly pleaded and supported |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (§ 2680(h) bars claims that "arise out of" government employee’s assault/battery, even if framed as negligence)
- Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988) (government may be liable for negligence if it breached an independent duty to prevent a foreseeable assault by a non‑scope employee)
- Satterfield v. United States, 788 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Shearer reasoning to bar negligent‑supervision claims where liability stems from assault of serviceman)
- Young v. United States, 71 F.3d 1238 (6th Cir. 1995) (FTCA liability is determined by state law and subject to FTCA exceptions)