Clifford Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff's Dep't
775 F.3d 308
6th Cir.2014Background
- Plaintiff Clifford Tyler, age 73, was involuntarily committed in Michigan in 1986 for about 2–4 weeks after a severe depressive episode; he has no subsequent history of mental illness, violence, or criminality.
- Because § 922(g)(4) bars any person “who has been committed to a mental institution” from possessing firearms, Tyler was denied a firearm purchase in 2011 and appealed administrative denials.
- Congress created a federal "relief-from-disabilities" mechanism (§ 925(c)) and a state-grant incentive (NICS Improvement Amendments Act) for state relief programs, but federal funding for the federal relief program was defunded in 1992 and Michigan has not implemented a qualifying state program.
- Tyler sued, alleging § 922(g)(4) as applied to him violates the Second and Due Process/Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees; the district court dismissed, holding Heller excepted the mentally ill and (alternatively) § 922(g)(4) survives intermediate scrutiny.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding Tyler’s complaint plausibly states a Second Amendment violation because history is inconclusive as to whether the class “ever committed” was categorically unprotected and because the statute, as applied to Tyler, fails narrow tailoring under heightened review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(4) burdens conduct within the Second Amendment’s historical scope | Tyler: historical record is inconclusive; Heller’s exceptions do not automatically cover anyone once committed | Gov’t: Heller and McDonald treat the mentally ill as a presumptively unprotected class; statute is constitutional | Court: Government failed to show regulated conduct was historically outside the Second Amendment; proceed to step two |
| Appropriate level of scrutiny after step one | Tyler: heightened scrutiny appropriate for as-applied challenge to a categorical, status-based lifetime ban | Gov’t: intermediate scrutiny is appropriate (majority of circuits apply it) | Court: adopts strict scrutiny (majority opinion) though concurrence would assume intermediate; result would follow under either |
| Whether § 922(g)(4) survives heightened scrutiny generally | Tyler: permanent, status-based ban as applied to a non-dangerous, long-ago committed person is not narrowly tailored | Gov’t: law furthers compelling interests (preventing crime and suicide) and is a permissible prophylactic measure | Court: interests are compelling, but as applied to Tyler the federal/state relief scheme makes exercise of the fundamental right depend on state participation; not narrowly tailored as applied; complaint states a claim |
| Remedy for Tyler’s as-applied challenge given unfunded federal relief and Michigan’s lack of state program | Tyler: his ability to regain rights is illusory (no funded federal process; Michigan offers no relief), so permanent deprivation is unconstitutional as applied | Gov’t: availability of relief in other states and Congress’s program shows tailored approach | Held: Because Tyler lacks any realistic avenue to restore rights, § 922(g)(4) as applied to him fails narrow tailoring; remand for further proceedings (possible declaratory relief) |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes an individual right to possess firearms for self-defense and notes longstanding prohibitions on possession by felons and the mentally ill)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporates the Second Amendment against the states and reiterates Heller’s caveats)
- United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (articulates the two-step framework used by the Sixth Circuit for Second Amendment challenges)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (applies a two-step historical-plus-scrutiny analysis to Second Amendment claims)
- United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. en banc 2010) (discusses intermediate scrutiny and upholds § 922(g)(9) in the domestic-violence-misdemeanant context)
- United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2014) (upholds § 922(g)(3) as narrowly tailored in light of the statute’s limited temporal reach)
- NRA v. ATF, 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (examines heightened-scrutiny approaches in post-Heller challenges)
- Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014) (addresses scope of the right to carry and discusses multi-tiered scrutiny approaches)
- United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010) (applies intermediate scrutiny to a narrow class-based firearms restriction)