Cleveland v. Gross, 2022 Ohio 193

On January 23, 2021, Velina Gross was arrested on felony child-endangering charges and released on bond January 26, 2021.
The original felony charge was dismissed in Cuyahoga Common Pleas on February 26, 2021, after the state concluded the conduct supported only a misdemeanor.
A misdemeanor complaint for endangering children was filed in Cleveland Municipal Court on May 6, 2021; summons service initially failed and Gross first appeared May 20, 2021.
Gross moved to dismiss for violation of Ohio’s speedy-trial statutes; the municipal court granted the motion on June 30, 2021.
The City of Cleveland appealed; the appellate court reviewed the undisputed facts de novo and tallied speedy-trial days across the two proceedings.
The court held that only 54 days were chargeable to the State (tacking prior felony time, excluding the period with no charges pending), reversed the dismissal, and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting dismissal under R.C. 2945.71(B)(2)	City: statutory time does not include the period when no charges were pending; only 54 days ran, so dismissal was erroneous	Gross: speedy-trial time began at her Jan. 23, 2021 arrest and exceeded 90 days before municipal arraignment	Reversed: only 54 days were chargeable; no speedy-trial violation; dismissal was error
Whether R.C. 2945.71(B)(2) (misdemeanor) or 2945.71(C)(2) (felony) governs when an original felony is reduced to a misdemeanor	City: even if either statute applied, elapsed time did not exceed the applicable limit	Gross: 90-day misdemeanor limit applies from original arrest so time was exceeded	Court: regardless of which limit applies, only 54 days elapsed; no violation (but noted uncertainty in law about which deadline controls)

Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996) (speedy-trial statutes implement federal and state constitutional rights and are strictly construed)
State v. Broughton, 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 581 N.E.2d 541 (1991) (time between dismissal and subsequent indictment on same facts is not counted unless defendant is jailed or on bail under Crim.R. 12(I))
State v. Blackburn, 118 Ohio St.3d 163, 887 N.E.2d 319 (2008) (periods of delay from motions in an earlier case may be tacked to a later case based on same underlying facts)
State v. Azbell, 112 Ohio St.3d 300, 859 N.E.2d 532 (2006) (a charge is not pending for speedy-trial calculations until formally charged, held pending, or released on bail/recognizance)
State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 45 N.E.3d 127 (2015) (speedy-trial provisions are mandatory; courts must strictly enforce and count days precisely)
State v. Triplett, 78 Ohio St.3d 566, 679 N.E.2d 290 (1997) (purpose of speedy-trial right summarized: minimize pretrial incarceration and disruption)
State v. Bonarrigo, 62 Ohio St.2d 7, 402 N.E.2d 530 (1980) (time elapsed under an original indictment should be tacked to the period commencing with a subsequent indictment on the same facts)