433 P.3d 1200
Ariz. Ct. App.2019Background
- Arizona requires licensure for midwives (except RNs, physicians, or those supervised by physicians) to provide pregnancy, labor, delivery, and postpartum care; the Department of Health Services (ADHS) has statutory authority to define midwifery duties and adopt standards.
- In 1994 ADHS issued detailed midwifery licensing rules (A.A.C. R9-16-101 to -117).
- In 2012 the legislature enacted H.B. 2247 directing ADHS to “consider adopting” midwifery rules, including “revising the midwifery scope of practice pursuant to subsections B, C and D,” and establishing a process for parties seeking an increase in scope to submit reports and for an advisory committee to review proposals.
- After receiving reports proposing scope expansion, ADHS formed an advisory committee, held meetings/public comment, and issued revised midwifery rules in 2013.
- Midwife Wendi Cleckner (an advisory committee member) sued, alleging the 2013 rules unlawfully narrowed the midwifery scope of practice and exceeded ADHS’s authority under H.B. 2247; the superior court dismissed several claims and entered final judgment, and Cleckner appealed.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed, holding the Department acted within its statutory rulemaking authority under H.B. 2247.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether H.B. 2247 limited ADHS to only increasing the midwifery scope of practice | Cleckner: H.B. 2247 contemplates only an "increase" in scope; subsections B–D set procedures for increases and therefore preclude narrowing | ADHS: H.B. 2247 used the word "revise," granting discretion to change scope up or down; subsections B–D impose procedural requirements for requests to increase scope but do not limit substantive rulemaking | Held: Statute permits revision (increase or decrease); subsections B–D are procedural and do not restrict ADHS’s substantive authority to revise scope |
| Whether the 2013 rules exceeded ADHS’s rulemaking authority under A.R.S. § 41-1030(C) | Cleckner: The rules effectively narrow permissible midwifery practice and thus exceed the subject matter authorized | ADHS: Rules fall within the grant to define duties/limitations and adopt standards to safeguard health and safety; H.B. 2247 contemplated this rulemaking process | Held: The rules do not violate § 41-1030(C); ADHS did not exceed its subject-matter authority nor improperly use a general grant to supplement a specific grant |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352 (review of dismissal de novo)
- Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417 (pleading standards; assume truth of well-pled allegations)
- Dioguardi v. Superior Court (Ariz. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs), 184 Ariz. 414 (statutory interpretation of agency rulemaking reviewed de novo)
- Boyce v. City of Scottsdale, 157 Ariz. 265 (agencies’ powers are limited by their creating statutes)
- Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 202 Ariz. 481 (dismissal appropriate when plaintiff cannot obtain relief as a matter of law)
- SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (agencies are best equipped to resolve complex, technical policy matters)
- State v. Ariz. Mines Supply Co., 107 Ariz. 199 (legislature may delegate rulemaking to agencies given complexity of issues)