Clayton Frank Gutierrez v. Trisha Gutierrez
233 So. 3d 797
| Miss. | 2017Background
- Clayton and Trisha Gutierrez divorced after 22 years of marriage; dispute centers on allocation of a second mortgage (incurred during marriage but signed only by Clayton), alimony (lump‑sum and periodic), and contempt/attorney’s‑fees awards.
- Trial court’s April 23, 2013 judgment allocated assets/liabilities and awarded alimony; this Court partially reversed and remanded for clarification of (1) second‑mortgage allocation and deficiency liability and (2) alimony and contempt/fees.
- On remand the chancery court issued three judgments (Sept. 22, 2015; Dec. 29, 2015; Feb. 25, 2016) that: removed the contingent second mortgage from present distribution but made the parties jointly responsible for any future payments; set lump‑sum and $3,000/month periodic alimony; clarified college expense sharing; and found Clayton in contempt for some pre‑2013 nonpayments, awarding a money judgment and $5,000 fees.
- Clayton appealed, raising five errors (including that the court improperly separated mortgage allocation from alimony, misallocated the mortgage, erred awarding lump‑sum and periodic alimony, failed to credit him for child‑expense payments, and wrongly held him in contempt).
- The Mississippi Supreme Court applied a deferential review to the chancellor’s factual and equitable findings and affirmed the chancery court on all issues properly before it; one claim (child‑expense offsets) was deemed procedurally barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Clayton) | Defendant's Argument (Trisha) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Allocation of second mortgage and whether it had to be decided together with alimony | Mortgage is Clayton’s sole legal obligation (no privity with Trisha); therefore it is an individual, not marital, debt and should be charged to him alone | Debt was incurred during marriage and is a marital liability for equitable distribution; because it is contingent/unliquidated the chancery court properly removed it from present allocation and provided joint responsibility for any future payments | Affirmed: chancellor did not err — mortgage is marital for distribution purposes but, being contingent, was excluded from present asset split and a joint responsibility mechanism was proper; resolving mortgage then alimony did not violate remand instructions |
| Whether chancellor erred by issuing a Rule 54(b) judgment on the mortgage before reconsidering alimony | Remand required the chancellor to consider equitable distribution and alimony together; issuing a separate 54(b) certification was improper | Remand did not require simultaneous adjudication; equitable distribution must be determined before alimony but may be addressed separately so long as all awards are considered together in final analysis | Affirmed: chancellor acted within discretion; Ferguson/Lauro principles permit sequential but integrated consideration |
| Award of lump‑sum and periodic alimony ($3,000/month + lump sum) | Alimony award inflated by misallocation of mortgage to Trisha; no need for periodic alimony if Clayton bears the mortgage and child expenses | After redoing the Armstrong factors post‑remand, Trisha still had a deficit and demonstrated need; Clayton had higher earning capacity and maintained standard of living; awards were reasonable and within chancellor’s discretion | Affirmed: chancellor’s Armstrong analysis supported both lump‑sum and periodic alimony; awards not manifestly wrong |
| Contempt for failure to pay temporary‑order expenses and attorney’s fees (2012 contempt) | Contempt improper because July 2011 temporary order was ambiguous and/or Clayton complied with obligations; any contempt based on ambiguous language cannot stand; any award should be offset for Clayton’s child‑expense payments | Clayton admitted some nonpayment; chancellor clarified the July 2011 order on remand, found evidence of unpaid obligations, and concluded Clayton had ability to pay; contempt findings and fees were supported by record | Affirmed (majority): chancellor’s clarification and findings supported a contempt judgment and fees; inability/ambiguity defenses failed on this record. (Concurrence/Dissent would reverse contempt insofar as it rests on obligations that were ambiguous at time of alleged noncompliance.) |
Key Cases Cited
- Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss. 1994) (defines marital property for equitable distribution)
- Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss. 1994) (equitable distribution and alimony are distinct but must be considered together in overall settlement)
- Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278 (Miss. 1993) (sets factors to analyze alimony)
- Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So.2d 843 (Miss. 2003) (alimony should be considered after proper division of marital assets; equitable division may obviate need for alimony)
- Creekmore v. Creekmore, 651 So.2d 513 (Miss. 1995) (alimony awards rest within chancellor’s discretion and are reviewed deferentially)