Clayton County, Georgia v. Federal Aviation Administration, 887 F.3d 1262

49 U.S.C. § 47133 (1996) bars local taxes on aviation fuel and related airport revenues from being spent except for airport, local airport system, or other facilities owned/operated by the airport sponsor and directly related to air transportation.
In 2014 the FAA issued a policy clarification interpreting § 47133 to apply to all state and local governments (including non-sponsors), gave regulated entities until December 8, 2017 to comply, and invited action plans.
Clayton County, several cities within it, and Clayton County Public Schools (Petitioners) tax aviation fuel sold at Hartsfield‑Jackson and spend proceeds on non‑aviation municipal and school purposes; they do not own or operate the airport (Atlanta is the sponsor).
Petitioners submitted an action plan in 2015 and an "Amendment" in 2016 arguing the FAA’s non‑sponsor interpretation was unlawful. The FAA replied by letter (Nov. 17, 2016) reiterating its view that § 47133 applies to non‑sponsors, expressing concern Petitioners might be noncompliant, and offering to discuss offsets; the letter described itself as advisory and not final.
Petitioners sued under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) challenging the FAA’s 2016 letter as final agency action. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding the Letter was not final agency action.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the FAA's Nov. 17, 2016 Letter is "final agency action" because it announced a new, binding interpretation of § 47133 applying to non‑sponsors	Letter announces a new, binding interpretation that subjects Petitioners to § 47133	Letter merely restates the FAA's 2014 policy clarification that already applied to non‑sponsors	Not final: the Letter only restated the FAA's 2014 clarification, so it did not create new rights/obligations
Whether the Letter is final because it determined Petitioners violate § 47133 and threatens enforcement (creating legal consequences)	The Letter signals FAA will enforce § 47133 against Petitioners and they face civil penalties if they do not comply	The Letter is advisory, expresses concern, invites discussion of offsets, and disclaims finality—further administrative action would be required before enforcement	Not final: Letter did not determine rights/obligations or commence enforcement; further agency action required

Green v. Brantley, 981 F.2d 514 (11th Cir.) (standard for FAA order finality under § 46110 applies)
City of Oxford v. FAA, 428 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir.) (§ 46110 grants jurisdiction to review final FAA orders)
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807 (Court’s two‑part test for final agency action)
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (finality requires consummation of decisionmaking and legal consequences)
Riverkeeper v. EPA, 806 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir.) (interim/consultative letters not final when additional agency action required)
Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420 (D.C. Cir.) (agency letter that restates longstanding interpretation is not final)
General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442 (D.C. Cir.) (letters reflecting no new interpretation impose no new obligations)
Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.) (further administrative action needed before legal consequences arise)