255 So. 3d 238
Ala. Civ. App.2017Background
- Parties divorced by default judgment in 1982; court ordered the former husband to pay $225/month child support for three minor children.
- In 2016 the former wife filed a "Motion to Show Cause" alleging no payments had been made and seeking an order requiring the husband to appear and show cause for his failure to pay.
- At trial the husband admitted the 1982 order but testified he never knew of the decree or the support obligation; both parties gave conflicting testimony about gifts/payments. The youngest child reached majority in 1995.
- Trial court’s January 2, 2017 order recited facts and stated: "judgment is entered in favor of the [former wife] and against the [former husband] for $225.00 per month, commencing October 19, 1982." The order did not calculate a total arrearage or interest.
- Husband moved postjudgment under Rule 59; he appealed on June 9, 2017. The appellate court held the January 2 order was not a final, appealable judgment and dismissed the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court's Jan. 2, 2017 order is a final, appealable judgment | Clay (wife): order resolving liability and directing judgment for $225/month constitutes a final ruling enforceable on appeal | Clay (husband): order is nonfinal because it fails to calculate total arrearage and interest | Held: nonfinal and not appealable because it did not compute arrearage/interest; appeal dismissed |
| Whether wife's pleading should be construed as a contempt action | Wife sought only an order to show cause for failure to pay; thus she sought contempt enforcement of past-due support | Husband defended on statute-of-limitations grounds and denied knowledge/payment | Held: pleading construed as contempt action, but the Jan. 2 order did not explicitly adjudicate contempt; ambiguity contributed to nonfinality |
| Whether statute of limitations (§ 6-2-32) barred enforcement | Wife implicitly: contempt/enforcement of child-support judgments may survive majority and differ from ordinary judgments | Husband: 20-year limitations on actions on judgments bars her claim (youngest reached majority in 1995) | Held: not reached — court declined to decide statute-of-limitations issue because judgment not final |
| Whether Rule 59 relief and appeal timing applied | Husband argued Rule 59 timely postjudgment relief; appeal filed after motion | Wife implicitly: not applicable if judgment final; court record showed Rule 59 motion filed | Held: Rule 59 inapplicable because order nonfinal; court noted Rule 59 timing consequences only if judgment were final |
Key Cases Cited
- Palughi v. Dow, 659 So.2d 112 (Ala. 1995) (appeal lies only from final judgments)
- Davenport v. Hood, 814 So.2d 268 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (contempt may enforce past-due child-support judgments after majority)
- Cochran v. Cochran, 5 So.3d 1220 (Ala. 2008) (child-support-arrearage judgment aggregates past-due installments and interest)
- Corwin v. Corwin, 29 So.3d 913 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (interest must be applied to each installment of past-due child support)
- Ex parte Troutman Sanders, LLP, 866 So.2d 547 (Ala. 2003) (Rule 59 inapplicable to nonfinal orders)