Claudia Duff v. Hon. lee/tucson Police, 476 P.3d 315

A.R.S. § 12-133 requires superior courts, by rule, to set a jurisdictional limit (not to exceed $65,000) for compulsory arbitration and to require arbitration for cases under that limit; arbitration awards are appealable to superior court for trial de novo.
This Court created the FASTAR pilot (Pima County, 2017) offering plaintiffs a choice: an expedited short trial (with jury and appeal to the court of appeals) or arbitration (which waives appellate rights); FASTAR rules lowered Pima County’s mandatory-arbitration cap to $1,000, effectively eliminating compulsory arbitration there.
Claudia Duff sued the Tucson Police Department, filed both a § 12-133 compulsory-arbitration certificate and a FASTAR certificate asserting FASTAR inapplicability, and moved to compel arbitration under § 12-133.
The trial court denied Duff’s motion, concluding FASTAR applied and that Duff was not entitled to § 12-133 compulsory arbitration given Pima’s $1,000 cap.
The court of appeals found a conflict between § 12-133 and FASTAR and held rules prevail because § 12-133 is procedural; it nevertheless applied FASTAR to Duff.
The Arizona Supreme Court granted review and held there is no conflict: § 12-133 sets a ceiling (not a floor) and does not preclude a court rule lowering the mandatory-arbitration threshold; the trial court’s denial of arbitration was affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether FASTAR conflicts with A.R.S. § 12-133	FASTAR conflicts because § 12-133 requires superior courts to implement mandatory arbitration programs and FASTAR effectively extinguishes the statutory right to mandatory arbitration	§ 12-133 sets only a ceiling ($65,000) and leaves courts discretion to set lower jurisdictional limits; FASTAR fits within that discretion	No conflict: § 12-133 imposes a ceiling, not a floor, so FASTAR’s $1,000 cap in Pima is permissible
If conflict exists, whether § 12-133 is procedural or substantive	§ 12-133 creates substantive rights to arbitration and appeal (so rule cannot override)	§ 12-133 is procedural (prescribes method), so court rules could supersede where irreconcilable	Court did not resolve because it found no conflict; lower court had deemed the statute procedural but Supreme Court avoided the question
If substantive, whether FASTAR violates Arizona Constitution (Art. III) by altering statutory appeal rights	FASTAR unconstitutionally diminishes statutory right to de novo appeal after arbitration by eliminating appellate route for arbitration cases	FASTAR provides alternative remedies (short-trial route preserves appeal) and falls within the Court’s rulemaking authority	Not reached because no conflict; Court concluded FASTAR need not be judged against that constitutional argument here

Scheehle v. Justices of the Sup. Ct. of Ariz., 211 Ariz. 282 (2005) (discusses interplay of court rules and statutory arbitration requirements)
Seisinger v. Siebel, 220 Ariz. 85 (2009) (rules prevail over conflicting procedural statutes)
State v. Holle, 240 Ariz. 300 (2016) (courts reluctant to imply statutory limits that upset separation of powers)
In re Nicholas S., 226 Ariz. 182 (2011) (separation-of-powers principles caution against implied statutory limitations)
State ex rel. Neely v. Brown, 177 Ariz. 6 (1993) (legislature cannot divest superior court of original jurisdiction, but can confer concurrent jurisdiction)
Ray v. Rambaud, 103 Ariz. 186 (1968) (no vested procedural rights; changes in remedy are permissible if adequate alternative provided)
State v. Reed, 248 Ariz. 72 (2020) (confirms rule-preemption principle for procedural statutes)