201 So. 3d 779
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2016Background
- Appellant Classy Cycles, Inc. sought declaratory judgment and damages claiming Bay County and Panama City Beach ordinances exceeded authority.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for the local governments, upholding vest and insurance requirements for rented vehicles.
- Ordinances challenged include Bay County 14-12 vest rule, Bay County 14-07 insurance rule, and Panama City Beach 1337 vest rule and 1387 insurance rule.
- Ordinances require riders to wear fluorescent vests and require specified liability coverage for renters of motorcycles, scooters, mopeds, or similar vehicles.
- Appellees argued local regulation is authorized; Appellant argued preemption under Chapter 316 of Florida Statutes applies.
- Court held Chapter 316 preempts local vest and insurance regulations, reversing and remanding for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether vest requirements are preempted by Chapter 316 | Masone framework supports preemption of equipment rules | Local ordinances regulate a different, permissible local concern | Preempted; vest requirements expressly preempted by Chapter 316. |
| Whether insurance requirements are preempted by Chapter 316 | Chapter 316 provides comprehensive insurance framework implying preemption | Phantom of Brevard allows local insurance provisions | Preempted; insurance requirements impliedly preempted by pervasive statutory scheme. |
| Whether any exception in Section 316.008 permits the ordinances as temporary or experimental regulations | Ordinances address special conditions enabling exception | Ordinances are experimental/regulatory tools to address local conditions | Not applicable; ordinances are not experimental or addressing a true special condition. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sarasota Alliance For Fair Elections, Inc. v. Browning, 28 So.3d 880 (Fla.2010) (explains express vs implied preemption)
- Masone v. City of Aventura, 147 So.3d 492 (Fla.2014) (broad preemption under Chapter 316)
- Phantom of Brevard, Inc. v. Brevard County, 3 So.3d 309 (Fla.2008) (distinguishable; fireworks statute preemption not analogous)
- Tallahassee Memorial Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Tallahassee Med. Ctr., Inc., 681 So.2d 826 (Fla.1st DCA 1996) (discusses preemption context)
- City of Orlando v. Udowychenko, 98 So.3d 589 (Fla.5th DCA 2012) (extents of preemption by Chapter 316)
- Thomas v. State, 583 So.2d 336 (Fla.5th DCA 1991) (distinguishes bicycle regulation under §316.008(1)(h))
- Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (S. Ct. 2009) (laboratories and experimental regulations concept cited)
- Tribune Co. v. Cannella, 458 So.2d 1075 (Fla.1984) (preemption framework in state regulation)