Class v. United States
138 S. Ct. 798
| SCOTUS | 2018Background
- Rodney Class was indicted under 40 U.S.C. §5104(e)(1) for possessing firearms on U.S. Capitol Grounds; he appeared pro se and unsuccessfully sought dismissal on Second Amendment and due-process (vagueness/fair-notice) grounds.
- Class later pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement that waived many rights but did not expressly mention waiver of the right to appeal the statute’s constitutionality.
- At the Rule 11 colloquy the court advised Class he was giving up his right to appeal; Class pled guilty, was sentenced, and then appealed asserting the same constitutional claims.
- The D.C. Circuit held his guilty plea waived those constitutional challenges; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a guilty plea by itself bars a direct appeal of the constitutionality of the statute of conviction.
- The Supreme Court (majority) held a guilty plea does not, by itself, bar a federal defendant from raising a facial statutory-constitutionality challenge on direct appeal when the claim (if successful) would show the government lacked power to constitutionally prosecute and can be resolved on the existing record.
- The Court declined to treat Rule 11(a)(2)’s conditional-plea procedure as exclusive or dispositive because the Advisory Committee expressly stated Rule 11(a)(2) does not apply to Menna–Blackledge-type claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an unconditional guilty plea bars a defendant from directly appealing the constitutionality of the statute of conviction | Class argued a guilty plea does not waive a claim that the State may not constitutionally prosecute him (Second Amendment and due-process vagueness claims) | Government argued a guilty plea inherently waives constitutional challenges unless preserved under Rule 11(a)(2) or expressly reserved | Held: A guilty plea, by itself, does not bar a direct appeal of a facial constitutional challenge to the statute when the claim challenges the government’s power to prosecute and can be decided on the existing record |
| Whether Rule 11(a)(2) creates the exclusive procedure to preserve constitutional claims after a guilty plea | Class: Rule 11(a)(2) is not exclusive and Advisory Committee notes recognize Menna–Blackledge exceptions | Government: Rule 11(a)(2) requires reservation in writing to preserve waivable claims on appeal; it furthers finality and uniformity | Held: Rule 11(a)(2) is not exclusive; the Advisory Committee expressly said it does not apply to Menna–Blackledge claims, so it cannot resolve this question definitively |
| Whether Class expressly or implicitly waived his constitutional claims by plea agreement or colloquy | Class: Plea agreement did not expressly waive the right to challenge the statute’s constitutionality; colloquy did not explicitly waive that right either | Government: District court’s plea colloquy statement and plea agreement imply waiver of appeal rights | Held: No express or effective implicit waiver of the constitutional claims; the colloquy did not clearly foreclose the claims and the written plea agreement was silent on them |
| Whether claims that rely on factual development beyond the record are preserved after a guilty plea | Class: His claims can be resolved on the existing record (court accepted that view) | Government: Some claims (e.g., like in Broce) require facts beyond the record and are foreclosed by plea admissions | Held: Claims that would require contradicting plea admissions or extra-record factual development remain barred; but claims that challenge the State’s authority and are resolvable on the record survive |
Key Cases Cited
- Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (guilty plea did not waive prior constitutional claim)
- Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (due-process vindictive-prosecution claim survived guilty plea because it challenged the State’s power to prosecute)
- Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (guilty plea bars challenges to antecedent trial-related constitutional defects)
- Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (a plea does not bar a claim that the State may not constitutionally prosecute at all)
- United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) (guilty plea admits factual and legal elements necessary for conviction; claims requiring contradicting the plea or extra-record evidence are barred)
- Ruiz v. United States, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (a valid guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent; it waives many trial rights)
- Vonn v. United States, 535 U.S. 55 (2002) (Advisory Committee notes on Rule 11 are relevant to interpreting the Rule)
- Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) (guilty plea renders irrelevant certain pre-plea constitutional claims, such as Fourth Amendment suppression challenges)
