Clark v. State
300 Ga. 899
| Ga. | 2017Background
- On Feb. 5, 2008 Marlon Brown was shot multiple times after an altercation at Xaviera Wood’s apartment; blood trail and shell casings linked the scene to Brown’s body.
- Clarence Clark took possession of Brown’s handgun after Wood found it, confronted Brown in a breezeway, then chased and fired at Brown; Brown was shot in the chest, back, head, and arm.
- Clark initially denied involvement, then voluntarily came to the police station two months later, received Miranda warnings, executed a written waiver, and gave a videotaped statement admitting he chased and shot Brown.
- A Fulton County jury convicted Clark (Oct. 2014) of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; he received life plus a consecutive five-year sentence.
- Clark moved for a new trial arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel for (1) not objecting to witnesses/state using the term "murder" at trial, and (2) not objecting to admission of his videotaped statement; the motion was denied and Clark appealed.
- The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed Strickland standard and affirmed, finding counsel’s performance was not deficient and Clark showed no prejudice from either alleged omission.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to object to witnesses/state using the term "murder" at trial | Clark: counsel should have sought to exclude the term because its use prejudiced the jury | State: jury was properly instructed on elements, burden, and presumption of innocence; use of the word did not unfairly influence jury | Counsel not ineffective; use of "murder" was not harmful and jury instructions cured any concern |
| Failure to challenge admission of videotaped statement | Clark: statement involuntary because he was not told he was under arrest and "chased" wording harmed self‑defense claim | State: Clark came voluntarily, received Miranda warnings and waived rights; no coercion; counsel reasonably chose strategic use of statement | Counsel not ineffective; statement was voluntary and admitting it was a reasonable trial strategy; no prejudice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (review for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings and waiver principles)
- Capps v. State, 300 Ga. 6 (Georgia summary of Strickland standard)
- Hendrix v. State, 298 Ga. 60 (ineffective assistance framework)
- Dawson v. State, 300 Ga. 332 (use of the term "murder" in testimony does not automatically deny fair trial)
- Bradshaw v. State, 300 Ga. 1 (voluntariness and counsel strategy considerations)
- Smith v. State, 300 Ga. 532 (deference to reasonable trial strategy)
- Byrd v. State, 274 Ga. 58 (post-hoc disagreement with strategy not proof of ineffectiveness)
- Harris v. State, 297 Ga. App. 589 (custody alone does not render later statement involuntary)
- Nguyen v. State, 279 Ga. App. 129 (failure to move in limine about terminology not per se ineffective)
