Clark v. State, 251 A.3d 1144

In March 2018 police seized a .45-caliber semiautomatic "assault pistol" from the home of petitioner Jamel Clark's girlfriend after a monitored jail call and a search warrant.
Clark, who had a prior felony drug conviction, was indicted on possession of a firearm by a convicted drug felon (CR §5‑622), possession of an assault weapon (CR §4‑303), and possession of ammunition; the jury convicted him of the two weapon counts and acquitted on ammunition.
The parties stipulated that Clark was disqualified from possessing firearms and that the seized weapon qualified as an assault pistol.
The circuit court imposed consecutive maximum sentences (5 years under §5‑622 and 3 years under §4‑303). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed.
Clark sought certiorari arguing his convictions must merge for sentencing under the required evidence (Blockburger) test and, alternatively, under the rule of lenity; the Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed the lower courts.

Issue	Clark's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the convictions merge under the required evidence test	The assault‑weapon count is a lesser‑included of the §5‑622 firearm count because the same weapon satisfied both elements; §5‑622 is a multi‑purpose statute and absence of anti‑merger language supports merger	The statutes have different elements: §5‑622 requires a prior drug felony; §4‑303 requires possession of an assault weapon. Each offense contains an element the other does not, so they do not merge	No merger under the required evidence test; convictions may be separately punished
Whether the convictions merge under the rule of lenity	If legislative intent is ambiguous, apply lenity to merge convictions and avoid multiple punishments	Text, context, and legislative history show distinct purposes (preventing certain persons from possessing firearms vs. banning particularly lethal assault weapons), so no ambiguity requiring lenity	No merger under the rule of lenity; legislative intent is discernible and permits separate sentences

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (sets out required‑evidence test for same‑offense analysis)
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) (legislative intent can permit cumulative punishments despite overlap)
Nightingale v. State, 312 Md. 699 (1988) (multi‑purpose statutes and lesser‑included analysis where modalities supply different elements)
Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. 673 (2015) (analyzing legislative history and use of rule of lenity as last resort)
Nicolas v. State, 426 Md. 385 (2012) (application of required‑evidence test to determine merger/lesser‑included offenses)
Lancaster v. State, 332 Md. 385 (1993) (if each offense contains an element the other does not, convictions do not merge)
Pye v. State, 397 Md. 626 (2007) (absence of explicit anti‑merger clause does not automatically require merger)
Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1 (2011) (rule of lenity applies only when statutory interpretation tools fail to discern legislative intent)