Clark v. Pizza Baker, Inc.
2:18-cv-00157
S.D. OhioSep 23, 2019Background
- Ronald Clark worked as a Domino’s delivery driver/assistant manager in Cambridge, Ohio (Jan. 2014–Feb. 2018) at a franchise operated first by Pizza Baker, Inc. and then Precision Pizza LLC.
- Clark alleges delivery drivers were under-reimbursed and therefore not paid minimum wage, and that Domino’s corporate entities jointly employed drivers by imposing policies affecting working conditions.
- Defendants: Domino’s Pizza, Inc.; Domino’s Pizza, LLC; Domino’s Pizza Franchising, LLC (the Domino’s Defendants); Precision Pizza LLC and Lisa Burkett; Pizza Baker, Inc. and Christopher Baker.
- Clark’s Amended Complaint asserts FLSA collective claims, state-law wage claims, a declaratory-relief claim, and a civil-damages claim under O.R.C. § 2307.60 based on alleged willful FLSA violations.
- Defendants moved to dismiss (Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1)), to strike or stay collective/class allegations due to arbitration agreements, and to dismiss Count 6 and the declaratory relief claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Individual officers (Burkett, Baker) liable as "employers" under FLSA | Clark alleges officers are owners/presidents who control pay, payroll, reimbursement and day-to-day operations | Allegations are conclusory and merely track the legal test for FLSA employer status | Denied — allegations sufficiently plead operational control to survive 12(b)(6) |
| Count 6 (O.R.C. § 2307.60 civil damages for criminal acts) — is a criminal conviction required? | Jacobsen means §2307.60 independently authorizes civil suits for criminal acts without a conviction | A criminal conviction is required before §2307.60 damages attach | Denied — issue unsettled; court refuses to dismiss Count 6 pending Ohio Supreme Court guidance; defendants may renew if conviction is required |
| Declaratory relief (standing) | Clark seeks declaratory relief about future compliance | Defendants: Clark lacks standing because he is no longer employed; no concrete, imminent injury | Granted — dismissed without prejudice for Precision & Baker; also dismissed as to Domino’s (named plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive/declaratory relief) |
| Domino’s motion to strike/stay collective/class allegations based on arbitration agreements | Clark: premature; no corporate-store drivers have actually opted in yet | Domino’s: many drivers signed arbitration agreements; class/notice should be limited or stayed pending arbitration | Denied — premature to strike or stay at pleading stage; arbitration defenses are merits questions for later (conditional-certification/decertification or motions to compel as appropriate) |
| Domino’s joint-employer pleading specificity | Clark grouped the three Domino’s entities as a single "Domino’s" and alleged specific control measures (e.g., PULSE system) | Domino’s: plaintiff must allege specific acts by each entity to hold each as a joint employer | Denied — pleading is sufficient at motion-to-dismiss stage to attribute alleged policies/control to each Domino’s defendant; plaintiff may amend if needed |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (court need not accept legal conclusions; plausibility standard applies)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (complaint must state a plausible claim; factual allegations required beyond speculation)
- Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1991) (economic-reality test for FLSA employment)
- United States Dep’t of Labor v. Cole Enters., 62 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1995) (corporate officer with operational control can be an "employer" under FLSA)
- Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 454 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2006) (two-step approach to FLSA collective certification)
- O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (plaintiffs are similarly situated where a uniform, unlawful policy exists)
- Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (U.S. 2013) (named-plaintiff mootness in FLSA collective actions)
- Reyna v. Int’l Bank of Commerce, 839 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2016) (motion to compel arbitration against named plaintiff should be addressed before conditional certification)
- In re JPMorgan Chase & Co., 916 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2019) (where majority of potential opt-ins have valid arbitration agreements, notice to them is error)
- Taylor v. Pilot Corp., 697 F. App’x 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (named plaintiffs’ arbitration status affects conditional-certification analysis)
- Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993) (pleading inferences construed in plaintiff's favor)
- Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950 (6th Cir. 2005) (standards for 12(b)(6) motion analysis)
- Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (complaint construed favorably to nonmoving party)
