Clark v. Commissioner of Motor Vehichles, 183 Conn. App. 426

On Feb. 10, 2016, plaintiff James P. Clark crashed his Volkswagen off Route 85 at a well‑marked, heavily traveled four‑way intersection near a restaurant where he had been drinking earlier that day. A fire chief discovered the vehicle and called state police at about 9:38 p.m.; troopers arrived minutes later and found the car unoccupied.
Police contacted Clark at his home at ≈10:00 p.m.; Clark then arrived with his daughter in a third‑party truck. Trooper Kowalsky observed slurred speech, glazed eyes, and odor of alcohol, and Clark failed field sobriety tests.
Breath testing at the barracks began at 11:05 p.m., producing readings ≈.156–.157. Clark was arrested and charged with DUI and related offenses.
At the DMV administrative hearing Clark did not testify or cross‑examine the officer; the hearing officer (acting for the Commissioner) found probable cause and a temporal nexus that testing commenced within two hours of operation, and suspended Clark’s licenses.
Clark appealed under the UAPA to Superior Court, which upheld the Commissioner. Clark moved to reargue asserting ineffective assistance of administrative counsel and proffered affidavits that he was not the driver; the court denied relief. Clark appealed to the Appellate Court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether substantial evidence supported finding probable cause that Clark operated the vehicle within two hours of testing (i.e., on/after 9:05 p.m.)	Clark: crash occurred before 9:05 p.m. and he sat in the car until the fire chief arrived, so BAC tests at 11:05 were outside the two‑hour window.	Commissioner: circumstantial evidence (proximity to restaurant, heavy traffic intersection, quick reporting by fire chief, Clark’s hurried trip to pick up daughter, failure to remain at scene) supports inference operation occurred after 9:05 and closer to 9:38.	Affirmed: substantial circumstantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s finding of probable cause and that testing commenced within two hours of operation.
Whether Superior Court abused its discretion in denying motion to reargue/reconsider based on ineffective assistance and proffered affidavits that Clark was not the driver	Clark: counsel failed to present affidavits and other evidence at the administrative hearing due to distraction; this constitutes good cause and amounts to ineffective assistance warranting reconsideration/remand.	Commissioner: Clark knew the evidence before the hearing and failed to timely seek remand under § 4‑183(h); court had discretion to deny remand and did not abuse it.	Affirmed: denial was not an abuse of discretion because Clark failed to timely move for remand under § 4‑183(h) and offered no adequate explanation for the delay.

Murphy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 254 Conn. 333 (Conn. 2000) (standard for substantial evidence and use of circumstantial evidence to infer temporal nexus for DUI probable cause)
Salmon v. Dep’t of Health & Addiction Servs., 259 Conn. 288 (Conn. 2001) (standards for remand under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4‑183(h) and when ineffective assistance can justify remand)
Finley v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 113 Conn. App. 417 (Conn. App. 2009) (administrative review principles and deference to commissioner’s factual findings)