Clark Construction Group, Inc. v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services and John Chavis
123 A.3d 199
D.C.2015Background
- On June 22, 2012 John Chavis, a Clark Construction employee, suffered work-related neck, shoulder, back pain and headaches and received psychiatric treatment from Dr. Faheem Moghal for major depression.
- Clark and its insurer, Zurich, had Dr. Brian Schulman evaluate Chavis; Schulman found ongoing linkage between physical pain and depressive symptoms and recommended additional psychiatric treatment and medication changes.
- Petitioners requested an informal conference before the Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) asking authorization to change Chavis’s attending physician; OWC granted the request in a two-page final order after the informal conference.
- Chavis appealed to the Compensation Review Board (CRB), which vacated OWC’s order, holding that the Workers’ Compensation Act and regulations authorize only the employee (not the employer) to request a change of attending physician before OWC.
- Petitioners sought review in the D.C. Court of Appeals. The court deferred to the CRB’s reasonable statutory interpretation and affirmed, holding employers lack the statutory right to petition OWC to change an employee’s attending physician (though OWC itself may order a change when it deems it necessary or desirable).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether employer/insurer may request OWC to change an injured employee’s attending physician | Clark: The Mayor (via OWC) has authority under D.C. Code §32‑1507(b)(4) to order a change; an employer may therefore request such a change via OWC informal procedures | Chavis: The statute and regulations expressly give the employee the right to choose and request a change of physician; no provision grants employers that request right | Held: Employer/insurer cannot petition OWC to change the employee’s treating physician; CRB’s interpretation is reasonable and affirmed |
| Whether OWC may itself order change of physician irrespective of who requests it | Clark: OWC may order changes when in the employee’s best interest; petitioners argued OWC should be able to act on employer input | Chavis: OWC may order changes but employer lacks standing to invoke that power | Held: OWC (as Mayor’s designee) retains authority to order a change when it deems necessary or desirable, but employer lacks statutory right to request that change |
| Role of regulations on change-of-physician requests | Clark: Informal procedures (7 DCMR §219) allow employer to bring disputes to OWC, so employer may trigger a change request | Chavis: 7 DCMR §§212.12–.13 and D.C. Code §32‑1507(b)(3) focus the change-right on employees; regulations do not authorize employer-initiated change requests | Held: Regulations confirm employee-centered right to choose/request change; they do not grant employer the right to seek a change |
| Whether court should interpret statute to imply employer request right | Clark: Court should read supervisory power broadly and permit employers to present medical information and request changes | Chavis: Express statutory language grants employee choice; implying employer right conflicts with employee‑centered remedial purpose and expressio unius | Held: Court will not infer an employer right absent explicit grant; expressio unius supports limiting the right to employees |
Key Cases Cited
- Fluellyn v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 54 A.3d 1156 (D.C. 2012) (standard of review for agency decisions under APA)
- Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 992 A.2d 1276 (D.C. 2010) (deference to agency interpretations)
- Sullivan v. District of Columbia, 829 A.2d 221 (D.C. 2003) (statutory construction principles — intent from statutory language)
- Hively v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 681 A.2d 1158 (D.C. 1996) (workers’ compensation statutes construed liberally for employee benefit)
- McCray v. McGee, 504 A.2d 1128 (D.C. 1986) (expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle applied)
