Clarisha Benson v. Fannie May Confections Brands
944 F.3d 639
| 7th Cir. | 2019Background
- Plaintiffs Clarisha Benson and Lorenzo Smith bought opaque 7‑ounce boxes of Fannie May chocolates (Mint Meltaways and Pixies) for $9.99; boxes disclosed net weight and pieces but were approximately 33–38% slack‑fill (empty space).
- Plaintiffs alleged the slack‑fill was nonfunctional and misleading, causing consumers to overestimate the quantity of chocolate, and sued on behalf of a putative class under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (ICFA), and for unjust enrichment and breach of implied contract.
- The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding plaintiffs had not pleaded an FDCA violation and that FDCA preempted the state‑law claims.
- On appeal the Seventh Circuit held the district court erred to the extent it dismissed on FDCA preemption as a pleading‑stage matter (preemption is an affirmative defense), but affirmed the dismissal on other grounds.
- The Seventh Circuit concluded plaintiffs adequately pleaded deceptive and unfair conduct for pleading purposes but failed to plausibly allege the required element of "actual damage" (pecuniary loss) under the ICFA; unjust enrichment and implied‑contract claims therefore also failed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FDCA preempts state claims or required pleading of FDCA nonfunctional slack‑fill | Benson argued nonfunctional slack‑fill made containers misleading; state claims permitted despite FDCA because plaintiffs seek state remedies | Fannie May argued FDCA (and its rules on slack‑fill) preempt state claims and plaintiffs failed to plead FDCA violation | Court: FDCA preemption is an affirmative defense; district erred to dismiss on that ground at pleading stage (affirmative defense not basis for 12(b)(6)) |
| Whether ICFA deceptive‑practice claim met pleading standards (Rule 9(b)) | Benson alleged opaque packaging and percent slack‑fill misled reasonable consumers into overestimating quantity; pleaded who/what/when/where/how | Fannie May argued accurate net weight and piece counts on packaging/receipts negate any reasonable consumer deception | Court: Deceptive‑act allegations were pleaded with sufficient particularity to survive a motion to dismiss; factual dispute (labels vs package size inference) not decided at pleading stage |
| Whether ICFA unfair‑practice claim was sufficiently pleaded | Benson alleged the slack‑fill practice offends public policy, is unethical, and causes substantial consumer injury | Fannie May disputed injury and ethical/public policy assertions | Court: Unfair‑practice claim satisfies notice pleading (no heightened Rule 9(b) requirement) and survives pleading stage |
| Whether plaintiffs pleaded "actual damages" (pecuniary loss) under ICFA | Benson claimed she would not have purchased had she known slack‑fill and sought refund proportional to nonfunctional slack‑fill | Fannie May argued plaintiffs paid fair value for the chocolate received; no allegation that product was worth less or obtainable cheaper elsewhere | Court: Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege pecuniary loss or show they paid more than the product's value; ICFA claims dismissed for lack of actual damage; unjust enrichment and implied contract claims also fail (unjust enrichment tied to ICFA; express sales contract precludes implied contract) |
Key Cases Cited
- Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2014) (pleading standard and requirement to allege actual pecuniary loss under ICFA)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim for relief)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (facial plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Vanzant v. Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc., 934 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing deceptive vs. unfair ICFA claims and Rule 9(b) application)
- Kim v. Carter's Inc., 598 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (actual damages require showing payment in excess of received value)
- Turek v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 662 F.3d 423 (7th Cir. 2011) (FDCA does not create a private right of action)
- Fifth Third Bank ex rel. Tr. Officer v. CSX Corp., 415 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2005) (preemption is an affirmative defense and defendant bears burden)
- Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirmative defenses ordinarily cannot justify Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)