Clarence Brown v. Allison Taylor
911 F.3d 235
5th Cir.2018Background
- Clarence Brown, civilly committed under Texas SVPA after release from prison in 2011, was placed in contractor-run residential facilities (Avalon) in El Paso and Fort Worth, then detained in Tarrant County jails in 2012 after facility rejection.
- Brown alleged Avalon facilities were prison-like (razor wire, cameras, housing with prisoners/parolees), staff confiscated property, and grievances produced retaliation.
- After being rejected from Fort Worth, Brown was arrested for violating commitment conditions, spent ~6 months pretrial, posted bond, but was confined at Cold Springs Jail without sex-offender treatment until his acquittal; he alleges continued punitive treatment and delayed transfer to a residential facility.
- Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Avalon personnel, Tarrant County, Sheriff Dee Anderson, and OVSOM executive Allison Taylor (individual and official capacities). The district court sua sponte dismissed his complaint; this Court previously vacated an earlier dismissal and now reviews the later dismissals and denial of leave to amend.
- The Fifth Circuit evaluates whether Avalon conditions and jail confinements violated due process and whether rejection/transfer constituted retaliation; it also reviews the denial of leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Due process claim re: Avalon facilities (El Paso, Fort Worth) | Conditions were prison-like and thus punitive, violating substantive due process | Facilities’ security and rules were reasonably related to civil-commitment goals of supervision and treatment | Dismissal affirmed — Brown failed to plead conditions lacked reasonable relation to commitment purposes |
| Due process claim for post-bond confinement at Cold Springs Jail | Brown was held after posting bond without sex-offender treatment, so confinement did not further commitment goals | Confinement was authorized by commitment order or contractual placement and thus permissible | Dismissal vacated in part — claim against Sheriff Anderson and Tarrant County survives (sufficient allegations); claim against Taylor dismissed (no personal involvement alleged) |
| Due process claim for post-acquittal confinement | Continued confinement post-acquittal was punitive | State resumed providing treatment after acquittal and release conditions bore relation to supervision/treatment | Dismissal affirmed — no cognizable due process claim for post-acquittal period |
| Retaliation claim for rejection from Fort Worth leading to arrest/confinement | Basham rejected Brown because Brown filed grievances; statements and timing show retaliatory motive causing adverse consequences | Rejection and administrative decisions are discretionary and not actionable absent causation/direct involvement | Dismissal vacated in part — retaliation claim against Basham survives (sufficient direct/chronology allegations); claim against Taylor dismissed (no personal causation alleged) |
Key Cases Cited
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (civil commitment permissible despite restrictive conditions)
- Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (conditions and duration must bear reasonable relation to commitment purposes)
- Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (civilly committed persons entitled to more considerate treatment than prisoners but states have latitude)
- Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (state authority to confine mentally ill to protect public)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- In re Commitment of Fisher, 164 S.W.3d 637 (Tex.) (upholding original SVPA as rationally related to nonpunitive purposes)
- Vandyke v. State, 538 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.) (discussing amendments to SVPA and decriminalization of noncompliance)
- Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267 (5th Cir.) (elements and viability of prisoner retaliation claims)
- Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736 (5th Cir.) (no respondeat superior liability under § 1983)
- Evett v. Deep E. Tex. Reg’l Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 330 F.3d 681 (5th Cir.) (supervisor liability requires personal involvement or causal connection)