Clarence Brown v. Allison Taylor
677 F. App'x 924
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Clarence D. Brown, civilly committed under the Texas Sexually Violent Predator Act after state criminal convictions; original commitment order required residence in OVSOM-supervised housing, GPS monitoring, strict compliance with OVSOM rules, and warned of criminal penalties for noncompliance.
- Brown sued OVSOM officials (some in individual and/or official capacity) and Avalon (private contractor and employees) alleging numerous constitutional and statutory violations arising from allegedly prison-like conditions while detained at Avalon-run facilities.
- The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice: (1) it found no jurisdiction over six claims under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, and (2) it held the remaining claims precluded by a prior Northern District of Texas dismissal in a related case.
- While this appeal was pending, a Fifth Circuit panel vacated the Northern District judgment that had been the basis for preclusion; defendants conceded preclusion no longer bars Brown’s claims.
- The Fifth Circuit considered other defenses raised by defendants (mootness, Eleventh Amendment, Rule 12(b)(6)) but declined to resolve unbriefed merits issues, remanding for further proceedings and vacating the district court judgment and the PLRA “strike.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Applicability of Rooker–Feldman to claims challenging conditions of confinement | Brown argues his claims challenge OVSOM/Avalon conduct and conditions, not the state-court commitment order | Defendants argue the state-court commitment order and statute dictated supervision and thus preclude federal review under Rooker–Feldman | Rooker–Feldman does not apply to Claims 3, 4, 6, 10, 12, 13; federal courts may review executive/discretionary implementation of the order and statutory challenges |
| Res judicata based on prior Northern District judgment | Brown contends prior dismissal was vacated on appeal and thus cannot preclude his claims | Defendants relied on the prior final judgment to bar the claims | Preclusion no longer binds because the prior judgment was vacated; dismissal on that ground reversed |
| Mootness and availability of prospective relief | Brown seeks injunctive relief and damages; argues some remedies remain (e.g., challenge to GPS cost) | Defendants assert statutory amendments and Brown’s transfer mooted some prospective claims and Avalon no longer controls his housing | Case not moot because Brown seeks damages (including nominal damages); some injunctive claims may be moot but district court should determine on remand |
| Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) | Brown maintains factual allegations suffice to proceed | Defendants argue many claims fail on the merits | Court declined to affirm on 12(b)(6) because defendants inadequately briefed the numerous claims; merits should be addressed first by the district court |
Key Cases Cited
- D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (establishes Rooker–Feldman principles and narrow circumstances barring federal review)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (clarifies scope of Rooker–Feldman and limits federal district-court jurisdiction over state-court judgments)
- Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635 (2002) (federal courts may review executive action enforcing a state-court judgment where review does not amount to appellate review)
- Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) (federal courts may hear § 1983 suits challenging state statutory schemes as applied even when related state-court proceedings exist)
- Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states and state officials sued in their official capacity are not "persons" under § 1983 for money damages)