Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
133 S. Ct. 1138
| SCOTUS | 2013Background
- FISA Amendments Act § 702 (50 U.S.C. § 1881a) authorizes the AG and DNI to target non-U.S. persons located abroad for foreign intelligence with FISC approval.
- Respondents are U.S. persons who claim their work requires sensitive international communications with people likely targeted under § 1881a.
- Respondents challenge § 1881a as unconstitutional and seek a declaration and injunction.
- The central question is whether respondents have Article III standing to obtain prospective relief.
- Standing theory hinges on whether future interception is “certainly impending” or can be traced to § 1881a, or whether present injuries from avoiding surveillance count.
- Court held respondents lack standing because injury is not certainly impending and cannot be fairly traced to § 1881a.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether respondents have Article III standing to challenge § 1881a. | Respondents argue a certainly impending future injury. | Government argues injury is speculative and not fairly traceable. | No standing; injury not certainly impending. |
| Whether present costs to avoid surveillance constitute standing. | Costs are ongoing injuries fairly traceable to § 1881a. | Costs stem from fear, not actual injury; not fairly traceable. | No standing; fear-based costs do not satisfy standing. |
| Whether standing could be salvaged by a broader or alternative rationale. | If no standing, § 1881a cannot be judicially reviewed. | Judicial review possible through FISC and notice provisions; standing not required for review. | No; conventional standing requirements apply. |
| Whether the Government’s use of § 1881a could be reviewed without standing. | Judicial review is necessary to prevent unconstitutional surveillance. | Standing required to access courts. | Not addressed; standing resolved. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing requires concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury)
- Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (U.S. 1990) (threatened injury must be certainly impending)
- DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (U.S. 2006) (standing not extended by speculative claims)
- Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 (U.S. 2010) (substantial risk can support standing if concrete actions to mitigate occur)
- Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488 (U.S. 2009) (standing can rest on reasonable likelihood of future harm)
- Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1972) (chilling effect without concrete harm does not constitute standing)
- Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (imminence and traceability require concrete injury)
- Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1988) (realistic danger of direct injury supports standing)