Clancy v. Bromley Tea Co.
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112722
N.D. Cal.2013Background
- Plaintiff Tony Clancy purchased two Bromley tea products and alleges Bromley marketed them with misleading nutrient-content and health claims on labels and its website; he sues on behalf of a proposed class under California consumer-protection statutes (UCL, FAL, CLRA, Sherman Law) and related claims.
- Bromley moved for judgment on the pleadings and to strike parts of the FAC, arguing lack of standing for products/statements Clancy did not buy/see, FDCA preemption, failure to plead fraud with particularity, and that certain claims (unjust enrichment, Song-Beverly, Magnuson-Moss, warranty claims) fail as a matter of law.
- The FAC alleges specific label and website statements (e.g., "natural source of antioxidants") and that Clancy relied on those representations in purchasing.
- Court treated standing issues under Rule 12(b)(1), other challenges under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b) as applicable; discovery stay motion was also briefed.
- Ruling: court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion—sustained dismissal with prejudice for unjust enrichment/restitution and Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss warranty claims; denied dismissal on standing (for purchased products), preemption, and Rule 9(b) sufficiency as to the remaining claims; discovery stay denied as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to assert claims about products Clancy did not buy | Clancy may serve as class representative and may seek to represent purchasers of other Bromley products; typicality/commonality addressed at class stage | Clancy lacks Article III standing to assert claims relating to products he never purchased | Court: Named plaintiff has standing only for products he bought; dismissing proposed class allegations for other products on standing grounds is improper at pleading stage—questions of typicality/commonality belong at Rule 23 stage |
| Standing for statements Clancy did not see on website | Clancy pleaded exposure to the website and reliance; alleges long-term campaign so specificity of each ad not required | Defendants say he must plead which specific statements he saw to have standing under UCL | Court: Allegations that he read website statements are sufficient for Article III standing; specificity issues are Rule 9(b) matters |
| Preemption by FDCA/Sherman Law private enforcement | Plaintiff enforces California Sherman Law (which adopts FDCA requirements) and brings state-law claims that parallel federal requirements | Bromley contends FDCA preempts state enforcement or that plaintiff seeks to impose requirements beyond FDCA | Court: California law that mirrors FDCA is not preempted; Sherman Law claims survive because they parallel federal requirements and do not impose extra substantive obligations |
| Pleading fraud with particularity (Rule 9(b)) | FAC identifies who, what, when, where, and how (labels, website, products, time frame, reliance) | Defendants argue FAC is too general to satisfy the "how" and reliance requirements under 9(b) and relevant precedents | Court: FAC meets Rule 9(b) specificity (identifies discrete statements, products, time frame and reliance); allegations sufficient to proceed |
| Unjust enrichment / restitution and warranty claims (Song-Beverly, Magnuson-Moss) | Plaintiff asserted restitution/quasi-contract and warranty claims | Defendants argue unjust enrichment is not a standalone claim; Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss inapplicable to these consumable/product-description allegations | Court: Unjust enrichment/restution as an independent claim dismissed with prejudice; Song-Beverly and Magnuson-Moss warranty claims dismissed with prejudice (barred as a matter of law) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plaintiff must plead facts plausibly showing entitlement to relief)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete injury, causation, redressability)
- Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974 (9th Cir.) (class action standing satisfied if one named plaintiff meets requirements)
- Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (standing/tension between standing and class certification)
- In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (California Supreme Court) (in false-advertising UCL cases, plaintiffs alleging exposure to long-term campaigns need not plead reliance with unrealistic specificity)
- Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir.) (limits on private Lanham Act claims implicating FDA interpretation; did not resolve state-law preemption)
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (supports presumption against federal preemption of state police powers)
- Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (state-law claims that parallel federal duties are not necessarily preempted)
- Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. en banc) (parallel state-law duties to federal MDA do not imply preemption)
- Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (state law claims that would interfere with FDA’s fraud-detection role impliedly preempted)
- Perez v. Nidek Co., Ltd., 711 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.) (preemption where state claim depends solely on FDA status or imposes requirements beyond FDA)