Clairmont v. Sound Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091

Clairmont worked for Sound Mental Health (SMH), a private contractor providing treatment to domestic violence defendants for the Seattle Municipal Court.
SMH had a contract with the Municipal Court; the court provided space and oversight but no direct payments, and labeled SMH an independent contractor.
Clairmont was subpoenaed to testify as an expert witness in a revocation hearing involving a client of a different treatment provider.
Following Clairmont's testimony, Joni Wilson, Manager of Probation Services, informed SMH and Clairmont that concerns about his performance and the program’s integrity existed, leading to Clairmont’s termination.
Clairmont sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation; the district court granted Wilson summary judgment on qualified immunity.
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding Clairmont’s speech analyzed as a public employee’s under Pickering, and that qualified immunity was not clearly established to shield Wilson.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Should Clairmont be treated as a public employee for First Amendment analysis?	Clairmont’s role and contract with SMH make him akin to an employee.	An independent contractor should not be treated as a public employee.	Yes, treated as a public employee for purposes of Pickering analysis.
Was Clairmont's subpoenaed testimony a matter of public concern?	Speech related to public safety and treatment integrity concerns.	Speech may be private or not related to public concerns.	Yes, speech concerned matters of public import.
Was Clairmont's testimony part of his official duties?	Testimony described treatment philosophy and duties.	Testimony was not placed within official duties and was subpoenaed.	No, not part of Clairmont's official duties.
Was the speech a substantial or motivating factor in the termination?	Termination followed Wilson’s comments about the testimony.	Other preexisting performance complaints could justify termination.	Yes, evidence supports it as a substantial/motivating factor.
Did Wilson have an adequate justification to treat Clairmont differently, or was the right clearly established?	Disruption or administrative interests did not justify retaliation.	Administrative interests could outweigh speech rights if disruption occurred.	No adequate justification found; the right was clearly established at the time, and qualified immunity did not bar relief.

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (U.S. 1983) (framework for evaluating public concern and speech in government employment context)
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1968) (balance between public employee speech and government interests)
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2006) (speech as part of official duties not protected)
Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1996) (independent contractor treated like public employee for First Amendment)
Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2009) (public employee balancing test and public concern standard)
Robinson v. City of Tacoma, 566 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2009) (clear establishment of public employee witness rights by 2005)
Rendish v. City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 1997) (public interest in domestic violence cases implicated by speech)
Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1992) (public safety concerns as public interest)
Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2004) (testimony on public concerns regardless of motive)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (two-step qualified immunity framework)
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (U.S. 2009) (modification allowing prong order flexibility in qualified immunity analysis)
CarePartners LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2008) (balance of government interests against protected speech in private contractor context)