City of Williamsport v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd.
145 A.3d 806
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2016Background
- Claimant (Ursula Miele‑Cole) filed a fatal workers’ compensation claim after her husband (Jeffrey Cole), a City of Williamsport firefighter (1980–2011), died of gastric cancer in 2011.
- Claim sought benefits under Section 108(r) (firefighter cancer presumption for exposure to IARC Group 1 carcinogens) and Section 108(o); Employer denied work‑relatedness.
- Claimant testified Decedent returned from fires smelling of smoke/ash on ~15 occasions; no fire logs, incident reports, or co‑worker testimony introduced.
- Claimant’s expert (Dr. Gelfand) opined Decedent had occupational exposure to asbestos and other carcinogens and that firefighting materially contributed to his gastric cancer, but he did not examine Decedent or review employment/fire records and relied on general knowledge and assumptions.
- Employer’s expert (Dr. Prince) identified non‑occupational gastric cancer risk factors (hypertension, smoking, obesity) and opined epidemiology does not support a proven link between firefighting or asbestos and gastric cancer.
- WCJ credited Claimant and Dr. Gelfand, relied on IARC Monograph (Vol. 98) listing asbestos and other agents as Group 1 carcinogens detected in fires, granted claim under Section 108(r); Board affirmed. Commonwealth Court reversed for lack of competent evidence of Decedent’s direct exposure to an IARC Group 1 carcinogen as required by Section 301(f).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Claimant proved Decedent had "direct exposure" to an IARC Group 1 carcinogen under §301(f) | Claimant: lay testimony that Decedent returned from fires smelling of smoke + Dr. Gelfand’s opinion and IARC monograph suffice to show direct exposure (e.g., asbestos) | Employer: evidence insufficient—no incident/employment records, no testimony tying specific fires to Group 1 agents; expert evidence disputes causal link | Held: Reversed — record lacks competent evidence of Decedent’s direct exposure to a specific IARC Group 1 carcinogen required by §301(f) |
| Whether WCJ properly relied on Dr. Gelfand’s opinion | Claimant: Dr. Gelfand’s expertise and IARC monograph provide a reliable basis | Employer: Dr. Gelfand lacked foundation—did not examine decedent or review employment/fire records and relied on assumptions | Held: Dr. Gelfand’s testimony lacked adequate factual foundation; WCJ erred in relying on it |
| Whether the IARC monograph alone proves direct exposure in this case | Claimant: IARC shows Group 1 carcinogens have been detected in fires, supporting exposure inference | Employer: IARC does not establish presence of carcinogens in specific fires Decedent fought; monograph insufficient by itself to satisfy §301(f) | Held: IARC monograph insufficient to prove direct exposure absent case‑specific evidence |
| Whether remand for further findings was required | Claimant: WCJ properly applied presumption and made findings | Employer: No factual basis for presumption application; WCJ’s findings unsupported | Held: Majority reversed without remand; concurring judge would remand for additional factual findings on §301(f) and presumption under §301(e) |
Key Cases Cited
- Baptiste v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Eichleay Corp.), 889 A.2d 641 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (lay testimony may show workplace exposure to hazard)
- Mauger & Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Waltz), 598 A.2d 1035 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991) (claimant may rely on lay testimony for exposure)
- Gibson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Armco Stainless & Alloy Prods.), 861 A.2d 938 (Pa. 2004) (expert testimony must have factual foundation consistent with evidentiary rules)
- Collins v. Hand, 246 A.2d 398 (Pa. 1968) (expert opinion must be based on facts warranted by the record)
- Witco–Kendall Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Adams), 562 A.2d 397 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (claimant’s burden to show exposure is not overly demanding)
- City of Philadelphia v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kriebel), 29 A.3d 762 (Pa. 2011) (presumption under §301(e) and burden shifting once threshold requirements met)