City of Wenatchee v. Stearns, 568 P.3d 658

Frank Stearns was stopped and arrested for DUI after a 911 call reported him as appearing intoxicated and staggering in a parking lot before driving away.
The 911 caller, David Gilliver, relayed contemporaneous eyewitness observations and identified Stearns specifically to the arriving officer.
Officer BrinJones observed driving in a manner that corroborated the caller’s description (weaving, nearly hitting a curb, speeding), but did not directly witness clear traffic infractions.
At trial, the district court upheld the stop based on both the 911 tip and observed conduct; on appeal, higher courts reversed, deeming the stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion.
The Supreme Court of Washington granted review to clarify how courts should analyze the reliability and factual basis of 911 tips as grounds for stops, and to address the distinction between a tipster’s “basis of knowledge” and the tip’s “factual basis.”

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 911 tip was sufficiently reliable to support a Terry stop	Gilliver's contemporaneous, eyewitness 911 call was reliable; officers corroborated tip	911 call lacked sufficient reliability; officers did not adequately corroborate the alleged crime	Reliable—Tip was from an eyewitness citizen via 911, corroborated by officer’s observations
Whether the factual basis of the tip, plus corroborating police observations, justified reasonable suspicion for the stop	The tip, plus erratic driving observed, gave rise to reasonable suspicion of DUI	No sufficient articulable facts pointed to DUI rather than innocent behavior or other causes	Sufficient factual basis existed for reasonable suspicion of DUI
Whether a basis of knowledge by the tipster is required, in addition to a factual basis, to justify a stop	Only a factual basis is legally necessary, not necessarily a basis of knowledge	Both factual basis and basis of knowledge must be shown for reliability	Only factual basis is necessary; basis of knowledge is helpful, but not strictly required
Whether use of the 911 system makes a caller presumptively reliable	Caller’s use of 911, possible identification, and risk of accountability increases reliability	Modern misuse of 911 (esp. for racialized or biased motivations) undermines presumption of reliability	Use of 911 bolsters but does not guarantee reliability; totality of circumstances still governs

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes standard for brief investigative stops based on reasonable suspicion)
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014) (911 tips can provide reasonable suspicion if observed behavior is contemporaneous and sufficiently detailed)
State v. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d 610 (2015) (Washington Supreme Court on informant reliability and reasonable suspicion from tips)
State v. Sieler, 95 Wn.2d 43 (1980) (anonymous tips must have some factual basis beyond conclusory claims to support stops)
State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940 (1975) (lays out test for evaluating tipster reliability and corroboration)