76 So. 3d 401
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2011Background
- Venice enacted 2009-06 amending the Land Development Code to prohibit short-term rentals of single-family homes in residential zones, with grandfathering for existing legal nonconforming resort dwellings only if registrations and licenses were obtained before July 14, 2009.
- Gwynn purchased the property in 2004 to rent to seasonal visitors but did not pursue grandfathering or pre-2009 compliance.
- After July 14, 2009, Gwynn advertised and rented for periods under 30 days, leading the Venice Code Enforcement Board to conclude she violated § 86-151 and to order cessation of short-term rentals for the remainder of 2009.
- Gwynn appealed to the circuit court (in appellate capacity), arguing the ordinance was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to her property, including a takings claim.
- The circuit court held the ordinance unconstitutional as applied but not facially, and quashed the Board’s order; the City sought second-tier certiorari.
- The district court granted certiorari, reversed, and reinstated the Board’s order, concluding the circuit court departed from essential requirements of law by failing to properly weigh Penn Central’s economic impact, investment-backed expectations, and the nature of government interference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the circuit court departed from essential law in applying Penn Central to Gwynn’s as-applied challenge | Gwynn (as plaintiff) argues Penn Central requires weighing economic impact and expectations, which the circuit court failed to do | City argues the circuit court misapplied Penn Central by not adequately weighing the economic impact and residual viable uses after the ordinance | Yes; circuit court departed from essential requirements of law |
| Whether the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to Gwynn | Gwynn contends the regulatory restriction constitutes a taking of her property rights without just compensation | City contends the regulation does not take all economically viable use since other uses remain and the impact is not a total loss | No; as applied, the ordinance is not a compensable taking after proper Penn Central analysis |
| Facial vs. as-applied challenges to the ordinance | Gwynn asserts the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face and as applied | City maintains only the as-applied challenge is implicated in this proceeding | Court treats as-applied challenge; facial challenge not sustained in this context |
| Whether the record supports a finding of substantial economic impact under Penn Central | Gwynn argues substantial economic impact due to reduced rental opportunities | City emphasizes remaining viable uses and market value considerations | Remanded/affirmed reinstatement; circuit court erred by not weighing pre- versus post-enactment value |
| Proper standard of review for second-tier certiorari in this context | City argues for limited review to the record and record-based constitutional claims | Gwynn seeks broader review of constitutional issues beyond the record | Second-tier certiorari review limited to procedural due process and essential-law standards; court complied |
Key Cases Cited
- Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (economic impact factors for takings: impact, investment-backed expectations, character of invasion)
- Taylor v. Vill. of N. Palm Beach, 659 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (economic viability and multifactor takings analysis)
- Gluesenkamp v. Leon County, 873 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (burden on claimant to show substantial deprivation of economic use or expectations)
- Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 1996) (economic impact and residual value framework for takings)
- Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 54 Fed.Cl. 400 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (economic impact considerations in regulatory takings)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 889 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (essential requirements of law review standard for administrative action)
- United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Santa Fe Med. Ctr., 21 So.3d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (departure from essential requirements equals failure to apply correct law)
- Wilson v. County of Orange, 881 So.2d 625 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (appeal under § 162.11 limited to appellate record; constitutional claims addressed on appeal)
- Kirby v. City of Archer, 790 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (took up appellate review standards for administrative orders)
- Holiday Isle Resort & Marina Assocs. v. Monroe Cnty., 582 So.2d 721 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (cited for appellate review framework)