CITY OF TULSA v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, 2017 OK 73

Background

Kendra Miller, a Tulsa police officer, was terminated for violating seven department rules; she and the Fraternal Order of Police (the Lodge) grieved under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
An arbitrator addressed whether Miller was terminated for "just cause" and, finding just cause for discipline (not termination) on two charges, imposed a 30-day suspension instead of termination.
The City sought vacatur of the arbitration award; the district court vacated the award and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, holding the arbitrator exceeded his authority and the award did not draw its essence from the CBA.
This Court denied certiorari on that appeal; after the appellate mandate issued, Miller and the Lodge moved to remand the matter to the arbitrator for further proceedings.
The district court denied the post-mandate motion to remand; the defendants appealed and the Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the matter.
The Supreme Court held that the parties are contractually entitled to arbitrate and directed remand to the district court with instructions to remand to the arbitrator.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether this matter should be remanded to the arbitrator after vacatur affirmed on appeal	City: The Court of Civil Appeals’ decision vacating the award is law of the case and resolves the dispute; no remand required	Lodge/Miller: Parties remain entitled to arbitration under the CBA and the case should be remanded for arbitration despite prior vacatur	Court: Reversed district court denial; remand to district court with instructions to remand to the arbitrator (parties entitled to arbitrate)
Effect of arbitrator’s phrasing "just cause for discipline" vs "just cause for termination"	City: The wording can be treated as equivalent; entire award properly vacated	Lodge/Miller: Distinction matters because arbitrator found cause for discipline, not termination, suggesting a remedial role remaining	Court: Noted the different phrasing but focused on contractual arbitration rights; directed remand despite prior vacatur
Scope of vacatur when arbitrator exceeded authority on remedy	City: Vacatur of entire award appropriate when remedy exceeds authority	Lodge/Miller: Even if parts exceeded authority, parties retain arbitration rights to resolve issues	Court: Acknowledged vacatur of the award but nonetheless required remand to arbitration under the parties’ agreement
Whether Court of Civil Appeals’ decision forecloses remand absent explicit remand order	City: Yes; the appellate judgment controls and no remand was ordered	Lodge/Miller: No; appellate vacatur does not eliminate contractual arbitration entitlement and remand can follow	Court: Held that despite appellate vacatur, the correct remedy is remand to arbitrate; reversed denial of remand

Key Cases Cited

City of Tulsa v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 93, 365 P.3d 82 (Okla. Civ. App. 2016) (affirming vacatur of the arbitration award for exceeding arbitrator authority)
State ex rel. Pruitt v. Native Wholesale Supply, 338 P.3d 613 (Okla. 2014) (law-of-the-case principles discussed)
Hays v. L.C.I., Inc., 604 P.2d 861 (Okla. 1979) (definition and effect of vacatur)
Matter of Meekins, 554 P.2d 872 (Okla. Civ. App. 1976) (vacatur characterized as rendering an order a nullity)