City of Sullivan v. Sites, 329 S.W.3d 691

In 1996, Sullivan planned sewer improvements and sought bonds to fund the project, with voters informed of areas to receive service and the new connection fees.
The bond issue was approved, and the bonds were special, limited obligations payable from net sewer system and waterworks revenues.
An ordinance set higher sewer connection fees for properties in areas without prior sewer service ($3,750 or $4,250) versus lower fees in previously sewered areas ($60 or $75).
Judith Ann Sites Trust owns property in a newly sewered area and faced both a connection fee and required construction along a nearby line; Sites refused to pay and the City sued for payment and authorization to enter the property.
Sites argued the ordinance is an unconstitutional special law under article III, section 40(30) by creating a subclass of all new sewer connections without appropriate justification.
The trial court entered a judgment for the City, and Sites appealed the ruling challenging the constitutionality of the fee ordinance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the sewer connection fee ordinance is a local or special law under article III, section 40(30).	Sites contends the higher fees create an impermissible subclass.	Sites argues the fees are justified by the project’s cost and benefits to new areas.	No; the ordinance is constitutional as a general law with substantial justification.
Whether the geographic classification for higher fees is substantially justified.	Sites asserts no substantial justification for charging higher fees based on location.	The classification reflects the benefit and cost-sharing for the sewer project.	Yes; the classification is substantially justified and tied to the public project.
Whether Larson v. City of Sullivan controls the outcome on this special-law challenge.	Sites relies on Larson’s limitations on special laws.	Larson did not address a special-law challenge; it affirmed authority and reasonableness of fees.	Larson does not control; the fee ordinance withstands the special-law challenge.

McKaig v. Kansas City, 256 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1953) (local vs. general law distinction applies to city ordinances)
Sprint Spectrum v. City of Springfield, 203 S.W.3d 177 (Mo. banc 2006) (defines general vs. special law; open-ended vs. fixed classifications)
Larson v. City of Sullivan, 92 S.W.3d 128 (Mo. App. 2002) (authority to establish fees; not addressing a special-law challenge)
Sunshine Enters. of Mo., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of St. Ann, 64 S.W.3d 310 (Mo. banc 2002) (de novo review standard for constitutional validity of ordinances)
Schrader v. Florida Keys Aqueduct Auth., 840 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 2003) (geographic classifications permissible where justified by policy)