City of South Miami v. Governor of the State of Florida, 65 F.4th 631

Background

In 2019 Florida enacted S.B. 168, which (1) requires local law enforcement to use their “best efforts” to support federal immigration enforcement, (2) prohibits “sanctuary policies,” and (3) authorizes local transport of detainees subject to ICE detainers to federal custody.
A coalition of immigrant‑rights organizations sued Florida’s governor and attorney general seeking to enjoin enforcement: alleging the best‑efforts and sanctuary provisions were enacted with discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that the transport provision was preempted by federal law.
The district court found organizational and associational standing, held the best‑efforts and sanctuary provisions violated equal protection (discriminatory intent + disparate impact), and permanently enjoined the governor and attorney general; it also enjoined the transport provision as preempted.
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reviewed subject‑matter jurisdiction de novo and focused on Article III standing (injury in fact, traceability, redressability). The majority concluded the plaintiffs lacked standing and vacated the injunctions, remanding with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The court held plaintiffs’ asserted injuries were speculative (no “certainly impending” profiling), resource diversion was self‑inflicted based on hypothetical fears, and any alleged harm was traceable to local law‑enforcement actors—not the governor or attorney general—so relief against the named state officials would not redress it.
Concurring judge criticized the district court’s inference that use of data from groups like FAIR and CIS automatically tainted the Legislature’s motive, emphasizing that objectively verifiable data cannot be deemed false or “tainted” solely because of the source.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Associational standing: are members’ injuries (racial profiling, chilled access to services) imminent?	Members face certainly impending profiling and related harms from S.B. 168.	Alleged harms rest on a speculative, attenuated chain (federal/local actions, profiling) and are not certainly impending.	No—injury not certainly impending; associational standing fails.
Organizational standing: did organizations suffer a cognizable diversion‑of‑resources injury?	Organizations diverted staff/time to hotlines, community meetings, know‑your‑rights outreach because of the law.	Diversions were voluntary responses to speculative future harms; organizations cannot ‘‘spend their way into standing.’’	No—resource diversion tied to speculative fears is not a concrete Article III injury.
Traceability/redressability: are governor/AG the proper defendants whose enforcement would cause or cure the harm?	Governor/AG can enforce S.B. 168 (e.g., sue localities, suspend officials), so injunctions against them will redress harms.	Local officials implement and enforce S.B. 168; there is no evidence governor/AG have enforced or will enforce in ways that cause the alleged harms.	No—the asserted injuries are traceable to local actors and not likely redressed by relief against governor/AG.
Merits (Equal Protection / Preemption): should appellate court decide substantive claims?	District court found discriminatory intent and disparate impact; transport provision preempted.	Even if merits arguable, lack of Article III jurisdiction bars merits review.	Not reached on the merits—court vacated the injunctions and remanded to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Key Cases Cited

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (threatened injuries must be certainly impending for Article III standing)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (elements of standing: concrete injury, traceability, redressability)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (past wrongs do not alone establish standing for injunctions against future conduct)
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (factors for proving discriminatory intent)
Fla. State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2008) (organization‑standing via reasonable diversion of resources to counteract concrete harm)
Georgia Latino All. for Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (when state officials have sufficient enforcement contact, standing may exist)
Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2019) (no standing where defendant had not enforced or threatened to enforce the challenged law)
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allows injunctive suits against state officers to enjoin ongoing violations of federal law)
Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1988) (governor a proper defendant where his enforcement power caused the alleged injury)